Schools, Race, and Money by Ryan, James E
Schools, Race, and Money
James E. Ryan'
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 251
II. FROM INTEGRATED AND EQUAL TO SEPARATE AND ADEQUATE:
THE DIMINISHED GOALS OF DESEGREGATION AND SCHOOL
FINANCE LITIGATION .......................................................................... 258
A. School Desegregation Cases ........................................................ 260
B. School Finance Cases .................................................................. 266
III. THE CREATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF GHETTO SCHOOLS ............. 272
A. Urban Schools: The Numbers ...................................................... 272
B. Creating Ghetto Schools: Residential Segregation and
M illiken I ...................................................................................... 275
1. Residential Segregation ......................................................... 276
2. Milliken I ............................................................................... 280
C. The Costs of Isolation ................................................................... 284
1. Monetary Costs ...................................................................... 285
2. Nonmonetary Costs and the Limited Efficacy of
Increased Expenditures ......................................................... 286
3. Obstacles to Effective Spending ............................................. 294
D . A R eprise ...................................................................................... 295
IV. LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD ................................................ 296
A. The Comparative Benefits of Integration ..................................... 297
1. Academic Achievement .......................................................... 297
2. Long-Term Benefits ............................................................... 301
Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to thank Michael
Heise, John C. Jeffries, Jr., Mike Klarman, Daryl Levinson, Elizabeth Magill. and Elizabeth Scott
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank the participants in the 1998
Constitutional Law Symposium, held at the University of Virginia School of Law, where I
presented a version of this Article. Thanks as well to the Law School library staff for cheerful and
expert assistance. Darcy Goddard, Toby Heytens, Mary Kane, and Sue Messenger provided
outstanding research assistance. This Article is dedicated, in loving memory. to my father.
250 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 109: 249
B. Two Strategies for Increasing Integration ................................... 307
1. Creating a Fourth Wave of School Finance Litigation ......... 307
2. Shaping School Choice .......................................................... 310
V . C ONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 3 15
Schools, Race, and Money
In the short run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our
great metropolitan areas to be divided up each into two cities--one




It seems unfashionable these days, if not atavistic, to talk seriously
about ways to increase racial integration.2 To be sure, one still encounters
attempts to spark conversations about improving race relations and
promoting integration, but a strong sense of fatigue seems to accompany
such attempts.' A distinct trend in academic and popular commentary, from
the left and the right, is to seek ways to move beyond racial integration as
an issue. Conservative critics of racially based policies, especially
desegregation and affirmative action, argue that such policies have achieved
about as much as they ever will, and that whites and minorities would be
better off if the government reentered a period of "benign neglect"
regarding issues of race.4 Critics on the left seem equally ready to abandon
integration as a good idea gone bad, as they either promote or excuse racial
separatismf The Supreme Court has joined and at times led this trend by
1. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717. 814-15 (1974) (Marshall. J.. dissenting).
2. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON. AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 1 (1993) (observing that the term
"segregation" disappeared from the public vocabulary in the 1970s and 1980s): James S. Kunen.
The End of Integration, TIME, Apr. 29, 1996. at 39, 39-40: Glenn C. Loury. Integration Has Had
Its Day, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1997, at A23.
3. Consider, for example, the recent Presidential Commission on Race. The Commission met
initially with some fanfare, quickly took on a tired feel, eventually released a report that
apparently received little attention, and has since disbanded. See, e.g., Kevin Merida. A Short
Leash for Clinton's Race Commission, EMERGE, Jan. 31. 1998. at 24, available in 1998 WL
11360589; Rhetoric on Race, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN. Sept. 20. 1998, at J2; Richard
Salvatierra, If Race Commission Pushes Quotas, Who Needs It?. TUCSON CITIZEN. Oct. 23, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 13141687; George Wilson, Playing with the Race Card, 34 WASH.
INFORMER, Apr. 27, 1998, at 13, available in 1998 WL 11470855.
4. See, e.g., STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM. AMERICA IN BLACK AND
WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1997); Loury, supra note 2. The phrase "benign neglect"
appeared in a 1970 memorandum that Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote to President Nixon. when
Moynihan was serving as Assistant Secretary of Labor. Moynihan suggested that the federal
government could adopt more of a hands-off policy toward the enforcement of civil rights laws
because of the educational gains that African Americans had made. See Charles Sumner Stone,
Jr., Thucydides' Law of History, orfrom Kerner, 1968 to Hacker, 1992.71 N.C. L REV. 1711.
1719 (1993); James Dao, At Career's End, Moynihan Reflects on Life of Public Service, TIMES
UNION, Nov. 15, 1998, at F3.
5. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAvED: THE ELUSIvE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION?: A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL
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ruling that policies benefiting African Americans are generally as
impermissible as policies discriminating against them,6 and by strongly
implying that it is time for federal courts to get out of the business of school
desegregation.
School finance litigation fits nicely within this prevailing mood. The
goal of school finance litigation, generally speaking, is to increase the
amount and equalize the distribution of educational resources and, in so
doing, to improve the academic opportunities and performance of students
disadvantaged by existing finance schemes. Such litigation is not targeted
to assist only minority students, but rather is designed to assist all "poor"
students.8 School finance litigation is thus often depicted both as a means of
moving beyond race as the salient issue in education reform and as an
effective way to achieve educational equity and adequacy for disadvantaged
students from all racial and ethnic backgrounds.9 Concomitantly, from its
inception thirty years ago to the present, such litigation has been seen as
either a supplement to or a substitute for desegregation litigation."°
EQUALITY (1996); Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure
Segregation To Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. I (1992); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid
Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again,
81 CAL. L. REV. 1401 (1993). Bell's famous article, Serving Two Masters, 85 YALE L.J. 470
(1975), was one of the earliest calls to reexamine the goals and implementation of desegregation.
See also Caroline Hendrie, Pressure for Community Schools Grows as Court Oversight Wanes.
EDUC. WK., June 17, 1998, at 23 (quoting the president of the National Urban League affiliate as
saying of the return to de facto neighborhood schools in Oklahoma City. "I don't have a big
concern about the return to neighborhood schools.... For me, the real concern is that children get
a good education wherever they go to school.").
6. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 642-43 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1989); id. at
520 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concumng) (" In my
view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race to
'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction."). Justice Thomas has gone so
far as to suggest that affirmative action is as immoral as laws that intentionally discriminate
against blacks. See id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I believe that there is a 'moral [andl
constitutional equivalence' ... between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute
benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equality." (quoting id. at 243
(Stevens, J., dissenting))).
7. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992): Board
of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
8. "Poor" is in quotation marks because school finance litigation typically seeks to obtain
more resources for property-poor school districts rather than for poor students; although property-
poor school districts are often populated by poor students, there is not a perfect correlation. See.
e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 57 (1973) (noting that "studies have
indicated that the poorest families are not invariably clustered in the most impecunious school
districts" (footnote omitted)).
9. For example, David Long, an attorney who has been involved in more than 10 school
finance cases, suggested when interviewed that focusing on race in these cases would have been
too limited and that the goals of school finance litigation were broader and more inclusive.
Telephone Interview with David Long (May 12, 1998).
10. See James Gordon Ward, Implementation and Monitoring of Judicial Mandates: An
Interpretive Analysis, in THE IMPACTS OF LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION ON PUBLIC SCHOOL
FINANCE 225, 233 (Julie K. Underwood & Deborah A. Verstegen eds., 1990).
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School finance litigation began in the late 1960s, at a time when civil
rights advocates were growing disillusioned with the pace and progress of
desegregation. Those involved in early school finance cases believed that
such litigation could accomplish a goal-improving the educational
opportunities available to poor and minority students-that desegregation
was only fitfully attaining." Similarly, those who are currently dissatisfied
with desegregation-an ecumenical and ever-growing group composed of
both liberals and conservatives, blacks and whites-believe that reform
efforts should be directed solely at improving the education that minority
students receive, regardless of whether those students are in integrated or
segregated schools. 12 More and more, one hears calls from courts,
advocates, and academics alike that desegregation is not the answer, that
the NAACP may have erred in pushing for integration rather than for
equalization of facilities and programs, and that poor, urban, minority
schools would succeed if only reform x, y, or z were adopted.' 3 Most of
11. See RICHARD F. EU-hORE & MILBREY WALLIN MCLAUGHLIN. REFORM AND
RETRENCHMENT: THE POLITICS OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 35 (1982)
(describing the goals and motivation of early school finance advocates). Derrick Bell. for
example, worked as an attorney on numerous desegregation cases before working on one of the
earliest school finance cases, Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). See ELtORE &
MCLAUGHLIN, supra, at 35; see also Bell, supra note 5. at 472 n.5 (noting that Bell "was a staff
attorney specializing in school desegregation cases with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund from
1960 to 1966").
12. See, e.g., AMY STUART WELLS & ROBERT L. CRAIN. STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE:
AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS IN WHITE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS 336 (1997). In their case study
of the St. Louis desegregation plan, which sends thousands of minority students from the city to
suburban schools, Wells and Crain report that " [t]ime and time again educators, policy makers.
parents, students, and 'people on the streets' of metropolitan St. Louis told us that the millions of
dollars the state pays to bring nearly 13,000 African-American students to suburban schools
would be better spent 'fixing up' the city schools." ld.; see also STEVE FARKAS & JEAN
JOHNSON, PUBLIC AGENDA, TIME To MOVE ON: AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND WHITE PARENTS SET
AN AGENDA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10 (1998) (reporting results of a survey conducted by Public
Agenda and the Public Education Network that indicated that African-American parents, by an
80% to 90% margin, "say the higher priority for the nation's schools should be to raise academic
standards and achievement rather than focus on achieving more diversity and integration").
13. The three reforms that are currently in fashion and that overlap to a certain extent are
standards-based reform (using curricular standards and assessments to regularize the curriculum
and chart progress), whole-school or systemic reform (reorienting the structure of schools and
classes), and site-based management (providing teachers, parents, and school administrators more
authority over the operation of schools). See, e.g., JEAN ANYON. GHETTO SCHOOLING: A
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN EDUCATIONAL REFORM 9-12 (1997) (describing the scope of
current reforms and the history of earlier waves of reform); ALLAN ODDEN & CAROLYN BUSCH,
FINANCING SCHOOLS FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE: STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE USE OF
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES (1998); KENNETH K. WONG Er AL. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC..
PROSPECTS: SPECIAL ANALYSES (1996); James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties:
Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform. 76
VA. L. REV. 349 (1990); Olatokunbo S. Fashola & Robert E. Slavin, Schoolwide Reform Models:
What Works?, 79 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 370 (1998) (describing various whole-school reform
programs). The precursor to today's reforms was the "effective schools" movement, which
sought to identify the most essential traits-such as effective leadership and strong teacher
preparation-of productive and successful schools. See, e.g., Stewart C. Purkey & Marshall S.
Smith, Effective Schools: A Review, 83 ELEMiENTARY SCH. J. 427 (1983).
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these reforms require funding, often funding above and beyond current
levels, which naturally increases the importance of school finance
schemes. 4 School finance litigation, meanwhile, continues apace. Nearly
twenty state supreme courts have declared their states' systems of school
financing unconstitutional, with five of these decisions issued within the
last two years. 5 Indeed, while desegregation is entering its twilight phase,
school finance litigation shows no signs of abating.
It thus seems an appropriate time to consider school finance litigation
and desegregation in tandem and to compare, before we turn our backs
completely on desegregation, the relative benefits of school finance reform
and desegregation. Surprisingly, such an examination has rarely occurred:
Very little scholarly attention has been devoted to the relationship between
school finance and desegregation or to the role that race plays in school
finance reform. 16 This relative lack of attention is odd not only because
each topic has separately received intense scrutiny, both academic and
popular, but because the two reform efforts share a long, interwoven history
as well as the overlapping goal of improving the educational opportunities
and achievement of poor minority students. 7 They also share the failure to
14. See Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equality in Education: Deconstructing the Reigning Myths
and Facing Reality, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 691, 697-98 (1995) (discussing the fairly
high costs of a school reform strategy developed by James Comer).
15. For citation and discussion of these cases, see infra Section II.B.
16. Indeed, as I have explained elsewhere, an ostensible desegregation case, Sheffv. O'Neill.
678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996), offers evidence relevant to school finance debates, insofar as it
reveals that equalizing expenditures at relatively high levels may not significantly improve the
educational achievement of poor minority students. See James E. Ryan, Sheff. Segregation. and
School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529 (1999). This case, however, has not figured in
school finance scholarship. This is not to say that the relationship between desegregation and
school finance, or the role that race plays in school finance reform, has gone completely
unexamined, but the exceptions are quite limited and focused studies. See Kevin Brown, The
Legal Rhetorical Structure for the Conversion of Desegregation Lawsuits to Quality Education
Lawsuits, 42 EMORY L.J. 791 (1993); Deborah M. Kazal-Thresher, Merging Educational Finance
Reform and Desegregation Goals, I EDUC. POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 7 (June 6, 1993)
<http://olam.ed.asu.edu/epaa/vln7.html>; Douglas S. Reed, The People v. The Court: School
Finance Reform and the New Jersey Supreme Court, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL' Y 137 (1994):
Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and the Impact
of the New Judicial Federalism, 32 L. & SOC'Y REV. 175 (1998); Kent L. Tedin, Self-Interest.
Symbolic Values, and the Financial Equalization of the Public Schools. 56 J. POL. 628 (1994).
The Brown and Kazal-Thresher articles, moreover, suggest that attention should be shifted away
from desegregation and toward financial reforms, which, as argued throughout this Article. seems
the wrong direction in which to proceed. See Brown, supra, at 803-19; Kazal-Thresher, supra.
17. See ELMORE & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note II, at 21-32 (describing early school finance
reform goals); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975) (describing the NAACP's
desegregation strategies and goals); RICHARD LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: THE POLITICS Ot.
SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 9-22 (1978) (describing the early history of school finance litigation):
MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,
1925-1950 (1987) (describing the NAACP's desegregation strategies and the exogenous factors
that influenced those strategies); Paul L. Tractenberg, A Tale of Two States: A Comparative
Study of School Finance and Educational Reform in California and New Jersey 20-27 (Dec. 5,
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realize fully that goal and thus shoulder some of the responsibility for the
continued existence of numerous schools in metropolitan areas that are both
separate and unequal.' s To understand why such schools exist in something
of a pre-Plessy world, one must pay attention to both school finance
litigation and school desegregation. 9
This Article is part of a larger project that seeks to do just that: to pay
attention to and explore the relationship between school finance litigation
and school desegregation. I hope to show that one cannot fully understand
the dynamics and limitations of school finance reform without considering
the dynamics of race in general and school desegregation in particular.-'
Indeed, the central contention of this Article is that, far from moving
beyond race, school finance reform has been and will continue to be
hamstrung by the obstacles created by poor race relations and the Court's
desegregation jurisprudence.'
Specifically, I describe how residential segregation and the limited
reach of school desegregation have helped to create and maintain schools
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal) (describing the goals of New
Jersey and California school finance cases).
i8. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure To Achieve
Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REv. 999, 999 (1994) ("American schools are
separate and unequal.... Forty years after Brown %. Board of Education proclaimed that separate
can never be equal in public education, American schools ae racially segregated and grossly
unequal." (citation omitted)).
19. There is at least one additional reason why the lack of attention to the relationship
between school finance and desegregation is curious, and why an examination of the two in
tandem is worthwhile. The research findings regarding desegregation often reveal much about
school finance reform, and vice versa, yet scholars from the two fields rarely seem to take
advantage of each other's work. For example, an ongoing and heated debate among school
finance scholars concerns the degree to which expenditures and achievement are related-or.
more colloquially, whether "money matters." See infra text accompanying notes 174-94. Cases
and research in the desegregation field, particularly regarding Milliken H1 relief, support the
argument that significantly increasing expenditures will not necessarily increase achievement. Yet
these cases and research are rarely if ever mentioned among school finance scholars. At the same
time, desegregation research also suggests that integrating students of different socioeconomic
backgrounds benefits poorer students academically and socially and is a worthwhile option to
consider from an educational-policy perspective; this research, however, is difficult to find in
school finance articles that seek to establish that money does not matter. One of my subsidiary
aims in this Article is to begin to bridge the gap that has separated these academic endeavors and
to utilize research from both fields in an attempt to sort out which reforms seem most promising
and which most futile.
20. See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 Mici. L REV.
(forthcoming Nov. 1999) (arguing that minority school districts, especially those in urban areas.
do not fare well in school finance litigation, and that race seems to play an influential role in court
decisions and legislative reactions to those decisions); Ryan, supra note 16, at 546-60 (arguing
that the underlying right recognized in state school finance cases could support a claim for racial
and/or socioeconomic integration).
21. 1 use the broad term "race relations" to encompass private attitudes and actions as well as
government discrimination, all of which, as will become apparent in the discussion of residential
segregation, bear some causal responsibility for the creation and maintenance of racially isolated
school districts. See infra Subsection 1ll.B. 1. There is obviously one caveat to this argument: Race
is not going to play a role in school finance reform in states that have small minority populations.
1999]
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that are isolated not simply by race but also by socioeconomic status. The
effects of racial and socioeconomic isolation, this Article suggests, cannot
be adequately addressed by school finance reform, because students in
schools with high concentrations of poverty need more than increased
funding to improve their achievement. Increasing expenditures in racially
isolated schools, moreover, cannot replicate the social benefits of racially
integrated schools. By helping to isolate not simply minority students, but
poor minority students, race has played a critical role in creating and
maintaining schools that appear to be beyond the reach of school finance
reform.
To put the argument simply: Although it is possible that school finance
reform could have been a helpful supplement to desegregation, it is a poor
substitute. Despite the hopes of early school finance advocates, we should
not expect school finance reform to solve the problems created by the
failure to desegregate many urban schools. Indeed, this Article suggests not
only that school finance reform has done little to improve the academic
performance of students in predominantly minority districts, but also that it
may be a costly distraction from the more productive policy of racial and
socioeconomic integration.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts. Part II offers a
brief interpretive history of school desegregation and school finance
litigation. One point of this history is to place in doctrinal context the
discussion of the limits of school finance reform that follows. Another is to
highlight the similarities between school desegregation and school finance
litigation and to describe the parallel progression (or regression) in each set
of cases. Specifically, the second Part demonstrates how both school
finance and school desegregation cases began as efforts to secure equal
educational opportunities for disadvantaged students through tying
arrangements: Desegregation sought to tie the fate of black students to that
of white students, and school finance equalization sought to tie the fate of
poor districts to that of wealthier ones. This original goal and the tying
strategy have largely been abandoned, and both desegregation and school
finance litigation now seem to operate from the implicit premise that poor
and predominantly minority schools will remain isolated. Instead of
challenging the isolation of such schools, both desegregation and school
finance litigation have become primarily concerned with securing
"adequate" resources for such schools.
Part III argues that the focus on money, at least in racially isolated
school districts, may be ill-advised. It explains how race relations in general
and the limits of school desegregation in particular have created and
sustained schools that are primarily composed of poor minority students.
Part III then describes the costs of these racially and socioeconomically
isolated schools. The first cost is purely financial: Because poor students
[Vol. 109: 249
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typically have greater needs, schools composed of poor students are costlier
to run than schools composed of middle- and upper-income students. The
second cost arises from peer influence: A growing body of research
confirms that peers generally exert a strong influence on student
performance and that students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds in
particular suffer from being surrounded solely or primarily by students from
similarly impoverished backgrounds. While the first cost of isolation can be
ameliorated with increased funds, the second one cannot be. Part III
accordingly suggests that the needs of racially and socioeconomically
isolated schools may exceed the reach of school finance reform.
Part IV argues that alternatives to school finance litigation, which
would aim to increase the racial and socioeconomic integration in
metropolitan schools, should be (re)considered. Part IV begins by
canvassing the still-growing body of evidence regarding racial and
socioeconomic integration. I contend that this evidence indicates that
integration is a more effective means of improving the academic
achievement and "life chances" of poor minority students than is
increasing expenditures in racially and socioeconomically isolated schools.
Part IV then turns to a consideration of two options to increase integration:
reorienting "school finance" cases and encouraging school choice,
including the use of vouchers. I suggest that these two alternatives, while
not guaranteed to succeed, are more promising than traditional school
finance litigation for the simple reason that they attempt to address rather
than elide the isolation and concentrated poverty that characterize minority
schools.
One final introductory note is in order. The purpose of this Article is
not to plead for mandatory integration. The Article does indeed contend that
increasing racial and socioeconomic integration seems more effective than
increasing expenditures in improving the academic performance and
opportunities of poor minority students. But there is a crucial difference-
one that this Article seeks to clarify-between effective policies and
politically feasible ones. Mandatory integration is politically implausible at
the moment because of significant popular opposition, among both white
and black parents, to "forced" busing.Y' This popular opposition, however,
is too often taken for proof that racial and socioeconomic integration are
ineffective as a matter of educational policy. This Article attempts to
demonstrate that the goal of integration remains a worthwhile one,
particularly as compared to school finance equalization, even if the
22. See, e.g., DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW
199-201 (1995) (reporting poll data); FARKAS & JOHNSON. supra note 12, at 26-27 (reporting that
only 22% of white parents favor busing as a way to achieve integrated schools, while 55% of
black parents support it); GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 73. 108 (1996)
(reporting poll data).
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traditional means of achieving integration (mandatory busing) is no longer a
viable option. My hope is that such a demonstration will help focus
attention on the appropriate question, which is not what goal should be
substituted for integration but rather which method holds the most promise
for achieving integration.
II. FROM INTEGRATED AND EQUAL TO SEPARATE AND ADEQUATE:
THE DIMINISHED GOALS OF DESEGREGATION AND
SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
School desegregation and school finance cases sprang from the similar
goal of equalizing educational opportunities for poor and/or minority
students. As Judge Robert L. Carter, among others, has explained, those
who litigated Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)13 believed that dual
school systems presented the key barrier to equal educational opportunities
for African Americans. 4 Indeed, although the Supreme Court held in
Brown I that separate was inherently unequal in the field of education, it
was clear that separate was also unequal in fact, in terms of the resources
and facilities devoted to educating minority children.2" The goal of the
desegregation strategy was thus not only to achieve integration for the sake
of racial mixing but also to improve the educational opportunities of
African-American students.26
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. See Robert L. Carter, Public School Desegregation: A Contemporary Analysis. 37 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 885, 885 (1993) ("When we were arguing school segregation cases in 1952 and
1953 before the Supreme Court, we saw the dual school system as the key barrier to equal
educational opportunity for African-Americans. With the 1954 declaration in Brown v. Board of
Education, I believed the path was then clear for black children to receive an equal education. My
confidence in the inevitability of this result now seems naive." (footnote omitted)); see also
Wendy R. Brown, School Desegregation Litigation: Crossroads or Dead End?. 37 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 923. 926-31 (1993) (describing the debate between Judge Carter, who supports more
integration, and Professor Kevin Brown, who supports African-American immersion schools);
James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Erplained. 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1486 (1990) (describing plaintiffs' "assumptions about the advantages of
interracial education" ).
25. See KLUGER, supra note 17, at 88, 122, 134 (describing the disparity in funding between
white and black students in the South); ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 36-37 (same); Michael
A. Middleton, Brown v. Board: Revisited, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 19, 32 (1995) (describing how black
children received inferior education under segregated systems because of severe underfunding);
cf. John J. Donohue III et al., Social Action, Private Charity & Philanthropy: Understanding the
Sources of Improvements in Black Schooling in Georgia. 1911-1960, at 3-4 (Dec. 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal) (describing how black schools made
relative gains in school quality beginning in the 1930s in response to the threats of litigation and
integration).
26. See Robert L. Carter, Reexamining Brown Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking Backward
into the Future, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 615, 617 (1979) ("[Tlhe basic postulate of our
strategy and theory in Brown was that the elimination of enforced, segregated education would
necessarily result in equal education."); Middleton, supra note 25, at 29; Martha L. Minow.
School Finance: Does Money Matter?, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 395, 395-96 (1991) (describing the
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Whereas school desegregation cases sought equality indirectly through
integration, school finance cases directly attacked the apparent source of the
inequality: the distribution of education resources. After the Supreme Court
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigue?17 held that school
funding inequities did not violate the U.S. Constitution, litigants directed
their attention to state courts and raised claims under both equal protection
and education provisions in state constitutions. Although the fora changed,
as did the source of the right, the goal remained the same: to equalize per-
pupil spending by dismantling school finance systems that relied heavily on
local property taxes for funds.28
Both school desegregation and school finance litigation thus initially
shared a similar strategy of binding the fate of poor and minority students to
the fate of their advantaged and white peers. School desegregation would
create physical ties by placing black students in white schools and vice
versa, such that minority students would necessarily benefit from the desire
of white parents and legislators to provide for their "own" children. -9
School finance reform would create financial ties by ensuring that property-
poor and -wealthy districts had the same access to educational resources; to
the extent that those with more resources wished to increase expenditures
on their own schools, the financial ties created by school finance reform
would require that access to resources in poorer schools be increased as
well.' One can easily envision how school finance reform and
desegregation could have worked well together to equalize the educational
opportunities of poor and minority children by ensuring that the fate of
disadvantaged students was tied to the fate of their more advantaged peers.
predicate of early NAACP work as the principle that "green follows white: money for schooling
follows the white students"); see also Liebman, supra note 13. at 396 (observing that scholars
have argued that the decision was about enhanced educational opportunities as much as about
integration).
27. 411 U.S. I (1973).
28. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1). 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971): Robinson v. Cahill
(Robinson 1), 303 A.2d 273 (NJ. 1973).
29. The widespread use of tracking in desegregated schools, which served to segregate
students by race within such schools, prevented this theory from being fully realized in practice.
See, e.g., JEANNIE OAKES, MULTIPLYING INEQUALITIES: THE EFFECTS OF RACE, SOCIAL CLASS,
AND TRACKING ON OPPORTUNITIES To LEARN MATHEIA11CS AND SCIENCE passim (1990)
(finding that disproportionately high percentages of African-American and Latino students are
assigned to low-ability math and science classes and that such classes are taught by less qualified
teachers and receive fewer resources, such as laboratories and science equipment).
30. The early theory of school finance cases did not require exact equality in expenditure
levels, but rather equality in access to resources, or fiscal neutrality. The principle of fiscal
neutrality required that all school districts have access to the same amount of resources for
financing their schools; the exact level of expenditures. however, would depend on tax rates
imposed by the districts and thus could differ. See JOHN E. COONS ET AL, PRIVATE WEALTH AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION 201-02 (1970). Despite the fact that expenditure levels could differ, poor and
wealthy districts would remain tied together financially under a scheme of fiscal neutrality insofar
as both would have access to the same level of resources.
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Things did not work out as planned. In fact, over the last twenty-five
years, the ambitious aim of equalizing educational opportunities through
integration and equalized spending has been largely abandoned, and
desegregation and school finance cases have been significantly
transformed. In many desegregation cases, the end goal changed from
integration to reparation; indeed, a number of these cases have come to
resemble isolated versions of school finance litigation. In school finance
cases themselves, the goal of equalized spending is being displaced by the
goal of adequacy; that is, litigants now generally are seeking recognition of
the right to an "adequate" education and the funds to provide it." Many
school finance and school desegregation cases thus have become primarily
concerned with obtaining sufficient funds to finance a basic level of
education in the poorest and/or most racially isolated school districts. With
this transformation, ties that might have bound urban and suburban
schools-student integration or equalization of resources-have been
severed. And although both sets of cases have served the immediate goal of
increasing the resources available to schools isolated by race and poverty,
they have also implicitly legitimized the segregation of such schools.
A. School Desegregation Cases
The desegregation cases have proceeded in roughly four phases. The
first phase, of course, was the enunciation of the right in Brown I and the
Court's vague call for a remedy in Brown H.32 The second phase involved
the various remedial plans at issue in such cases as Green33 and Swann4
and the scope of a court's remedial authority to achieve integration. These
31. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform.
48 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and
the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1995): William F. Thro.
Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts
Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1994).
32. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294. 301 (1955) (failing to establish a
standard or timetable for desegregation and instead holding that desegregation should occur " with
all deliberate speed" through plans developed in federal district courts).
33. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Green, the Court rejected freedom-of-
choice plans, which gave students the option of transferring from black to white schools, on the
ground that they placed the burden of desegregation on blacks, who were reluctant to transfer in
the face of intimidation. It also held that segregated or dual school systems must be dismantled
"root and branch" and that desegregation must be achieved with respect to facilities, staff,
faculty, extracurricular activities, and transportation. Id. at 438.
34. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971) (striking down
"racially neutral" student assignment plans that produced segregation by relying on existing
residential patterns in the district, ruling that desegregation must be achieved in each district's
schools to the greatest extent possible, and approving busing as a means to accomplish this goal).
35. In addition to the cases cited above, see Keyes v. School District No. I. 413 U.S. 189
(1973), which held that Denver must desegregate all city schools, and Alexander v. Holmes
Count), Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969), which declared that desegregation must occur
"at once" and that districts must "operate now and hereafter only unitary schools." Id. at 20.
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remedies, at least until Milliken I,16 focused primarily on the original goal of
integrating the schools.
Milliken I fundamentally altered the nature of desegregation remedies
and, together with Milliken I,31 ushered in the third phase of desegregation
litigation. Citing the importance of preserving local control of education,
the Court in Milliken I struck down a desegregation plan that would have
required integration among the predominantly black city schools of Detroit
and the predominantly white schools in the suburbs. In holding that a court
could not order an interdistrict remedy absent a showing of an interdistrict
violation, the Court foreclosed the possibility of achieving real integration
in Detroit and a host of other Northern and Western metropolitan areas
where school districts were coterminous with municipal boundaries and
urban areas were populated mostly by minorities. Without being able to
draw on the heavily white student population in the suburbs, urban
desegregation plans could not hope to achieve much integration, because of
the simple fact that there were not enough white students to go around.
Having foreclosed interdistrict relief in Milliken I, the Court in Milliken
II approved a modified desegregation plan, affecting only schools within
Detroit, which required that the state help fund remedial and compensatory
education programs. If the schools were going to be separate as a result of
Milliken I, Milliken II seemed to hold out the possibility that they might at
least be equal. 39 Not surprisingly, after Milliken I and Milliken H, the focus
in desegregation cases, at least in cases involving Northern and Western
urban school districts, shifted away from integrative remedies. .40 Replacing
that focus was a concern for the quality of education offered in the racially
36. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken ). 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
37. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (holding that a court could order a
state to pay for educational programs to repair the harm caused by segregation).
38. See JOHN C. JEFFRiES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWEL. JR. 312 (1994); ORFIELD El AL.,
supra note 22, at 11; J. HARVIE WILKINSON Il1, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 219-22 (1979).
39. It is interesting to note, given the five to four vote in Milliken I against the plaintiffs, that
Milliken HI was a unanimous decision in their favor.
40. See MARK G. YUDOF Er AL.. EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 535 (1992) ("A
number of courts, relying on Milliken II, have ordered the state or other govemmental units to
share the costs of implementing and maintaining desegregation and compensatory education
programs with the local school board."). A group of commentators associated with the Harvard
Project on School Desegregation describes the changes following Milliken 1:
Since 1977, school districts across the nation have used Milliken 11 provisions to install
state-sponsored compensatory educational programs for minority students in racially
isolated schools.... mhe programs have played an increasingly prominent role in
desegregation remedies since 1977. This is partly because the demographic patterns
evident in Detroit in 1974 have become more pronounced. School districts in the
nation's central cities and some older suburbs enroll large proportions of minority
students, while surrounding suburbs remain predominantly white. As patterns of
isolation persist, racial integration of the type envisioned in Brown has become
increasingly difficult to achieve. This pattern has forced school officials and courts to
rely on Milliken H programs to supplant rather than supplement true racial integration.
ORFiELD Er AL., supra note 22, at 154.
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isolated school districts. Thus, in the third phase of desegregation cases, the
goal of litigation was often to secure funding from the state to pay for
remedial plans designed to improve the quality of facilities and instruction
at racially isolated schools.4 In other words, the goal was not equality
through integration, but adequacy through remedial funding.42
In addition to the most (in)famous example of Kansas City,43 a number
of school districts have successfully sued state governments for funds to
finance "desegregation" remedial decrees.4 Yonkers45 and Philadelphia 6
are the two most recent examples; others include school districts in
41. See Assessing the Impact of Judicial Taxation on Local Communities: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong., 1996 WL 538968 (1996) [hereinafter, Assessing the Impact] (statement of Alfred A.
Lindseth). Lindseth, an attorney who has represented a number of school districts seeking unitary
status, explained that local districts have resisted recognition of unitary status to continue
receiving court-ordered funding. St. Louis and Kansas City, for example, have received a total of
over $2.5 billion so far to fund desegregation decrees; these districts currently spend $8000 per
pupil as compared to the state average of $4500. Thus, school districts have become willing
participants with plaintiffs in resisting unitary status. Lindseth suggests the same dynamic has
occurred in other states, including Illinois and Georgia. See id.; see also ORFIELD FT AL.. supra
note 22, at 143-78.
42. Cf ORFIELD Er AL., supra note 22, at 12 (reporting that a judge overseeing the monetary
remedies in Detroit called Milliken 11 a "limited form of reparations").
43. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (describing extensive programs ordered by
the court and funded in part by the state, pursuant to a desegregation decree).
44. Not all such suits have been successful. In School Board v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th
Cir. 1987), the court rejected the Richmond School Board's attempt to secure funds from the state
to finance compensatory and remedial programs. The case is nonetheless typical of the
transformation wrought by the Milliken decisions. After the court of appeals held that the
plaintiffs had failed to prove an interdistrict violation, the school board moved to realign itself
with the plaintiffs and sued the state for money to fund remedial and compensatory programs. See
id. at 1310. By the time the suit reached the court, however, the Richmond school system had
been declared unitary, and thus the court held that the state was not responsible for funding the
programs. See id. at 1314.
45. See United States v. City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1996). In Yonkers, the school
board (along with the NAACP) successfully sued the state for money ostensibly intended to
finance efforts to eliminate the vestiges of segregation. City leaders were delighted with the ruling
because
they may finally get hundreds of millions of dollars to pay for new classrooms and
more teachers for all students, not just those hurt by segregation. Mayor John D.
Spencer has long argued that the city has been shortchanged to the tune of $50 million a
year by a state education formula that favors the suburbs and rural areas.
Joseph Berger, A Shared Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1996, at B6.
46. See Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. School Dist.. 681 A.2d 1366 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1996) (ordering the state government to provide over $45 million to fund a remedial
order designed to improve educational opportunities for minority students in racially isolated
schools); see also Michael A. Riccardi, Lawyers Quickly Review Deseg Opinion: Both Sides Urge
Supreme Court To Act Siviftly, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 10, 1996, at I ("The most
remarkable turn that school desegregation litigation has taken in its 24-year history may be that
the court has shifted its focus from undoing segregated conditions to improving opportunity for
students in racially-isolated schools, estimated at 100,000 children of the city's 130,000 minority
students.").
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Maryland,47 Illinois,' Georgia,49 Ohio,s' and Arkansas.5 As in Milliken IH
itself,52 these cases often pitted unlikely allies against unusual foes, in that
civil rights groups representing school children teamed up with the districts
(against whom the initial desegregation case was brought) in an effort to
extract money from unwilling state governments. 53 The remedies were at
best tangentially related to achieving an integrated school systems' and
were often extended throughout the district to benefit schools never found
to be among those that intentionally segregated students.55 Plaintiffs and
courts thus used these cases to achieve what school finance cases were
47. See Berger, supra note 45, at B6 (reporting that Prince George's County. Maryland, the
10th largest school district in the country, has been trying, as have other school districts, to get the
state to pay for the costs of correcting what have become known as the - vestiges of segregation."
which include the sizable gap between the performances of white and black students).
48. See id
49. Curiously, DeKalb County, the school district at issue in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467
(1992), tried to obtain Milliken 11 funding while simultaneously trying to lift the district court's
remedial decree. See Gary Orfield & David Thronson. Dismantling Desegregation: Uncertain
Gains, Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY L.J. 759, 770 (1993).
50. See Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. 1533, 1536 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (describing the 1978
desegregation decree regarding Cleveland public schools that, inter alia, required the
"development of creative educational curriculums, including innovative reading and other
programs designed to correct the effects of prior segregated schooling as is reasonably possible").
51. See little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 716 F. Supp. 1162, 1190
(E.D. Ark. 1989), rev'd in part, 921 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1990) (directing the district court to
approve a settlement plan); see also ORFiELD ETAL., supra note 22, at 156-57 (discussing the use
of Milliken 11 programs at "Incentive Schools" that were part of a larger desegregation strategy).
52. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 292-95 (Powell. J., concurring in judgment). Justice Powell,
in arguing that the writ should be dismissed as improvidently granted, described the
transformation of the litigation from one that pitted student and parent plaintiffs against the school
board into one that featured the school board and plaintiffs teaming up against the state. The
plaintiffs and school boards, Powell observed. "antagonistic for years, have now joined forces
apparently for the purpose of extracting funds from the state treasury." Id. at 293. Indeed. Powell
noted, the school board "enthusiastically supports the entire desegregation decree even though the
decree intrudes deeply on the Board's own decisionmaking powers." Id.
53. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 79 (1995) (noting that the Kansas City.
Missouri School District (KCMSD) "has pursued a 'friendly adversary' relationship with
plaintiffs [and] has continued to propose ever more expensive programs"). United States v. City
of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600, 603 (2nd Cir. 1996) (describing how the NAACP teamed with the
Yonkers Board of Education in suing the state); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.
School Dist., 681 A.2d 1366 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (describing how the school district and
student-parent plaintiffs sued the city and state); Berger, supra note 45, at B6 (noting that officials
of Yonkers and the city's civil rights leaders "won a shared victory over an entity they have
gradually come to see as a common foe: the State of New York").
54. See, e.g., Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 275-91 (approving remedial programs that targeted
reading, teacher training, testing procedures, and counseling and career guidance).
55. See, e.g., Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 75 (describing a remedial order that required "a wide range
of quality education programs for all students attending the KCMSD," including full-day
kindergarten; expanded summer school; tutoring; an early childhood development program; and a
state-funded "effective schools" program that extended not only to the 25 racially identifiable
schools but also to the 43 other schools within the KCMSD). Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n, 681 A.2d at 1385 (rejecting the argument that a remedial order had to be limited to
racially isolated schools and could not extend to the entire district). Jenkins may curtail the ability
of courts to order district-wide relief, as it authorizes courts to order relief only for academic
deficiencies that are traceable to segregation and forbids the use of remedial decrees to promote
the desegregative attractiveness of an urban school district. See Jenkins. 515 U.S. at 94. 101-02.
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designed to achieve: a redistribution of funds from the state to poor and
dilapidated schools.
In fact, an eyebrow-raising correlation exists, in that desegregation
decrees have been used most extensively and successfully in securing funds
in states where school finance cases either have not been brought or were
unsuccessful. In Michigan,5 6 Missouri, 7 New York,58 Maryland, 59 and
Pennsylvania,' where Milliken II relief has been used extensively to fund
compensatory and remedial education programs in racially isolated school
districts, the school finance systems have never been successfully
challenged. Whether intentionally or not, at least some federal courts have
used school desegregation decrees to circumvent the limitations imposed by
Rodriguez or similar state-court decisions rejecting school finance
challenges. 6' At the same time, in those states where Milliken II remedies
have preceded school finance litigation, such remedies have made many
urban school districts poor candidates for inclusion in school finance
reform, for they have boosted those districts' per-pupil expenditures above
the statewide average, sometimes substantially.62
56. See East Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
education is not a fundamental right under Michigan's constitution and that the obligation to
provide a free public education does amount to an obligation to provide equal funding for each
student). Michigan's school finance litigation has a mysterious history in that the state supreme
court in 1972 held that education was a fundamental right and that the financing scheme had
failed to advance a compelling state interest. See Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich.
1972). The Michigan court subsequently ordered a rehearing. In the interim, the United States
Supreme Court decided Rodriguez, and the Michigan court's composition changed. In 1973. the
Michigan court, without opinion, vacated its opinion in Milliken v. Green. See Milliken v. Green,
212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973). Two justices wrote concurring opinions holding that education
was not a fundamental right. See id. at 717-18 (Kavanagh & Levin, JJ., concurring).
57. Litigation is pending in Missouri. See G. Alan Hickrod et al., The Effect of Constitutional
Litigation on Education Finance: A Preliminary Analysis, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 180, 187 (1992);
Rebell, supra note 14, at 693 n.6.
58. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982) (upholding a financing
scheme against equal protection and education clause arguments despite acknowledging
significant inequalities in funding; applying a rational basis review and concluding that the
education clause is not a mandate for equality but only a guarantee of a basic education).
Litigation is currently pending in New York, alleging that New York fails to provide a sound,
basic education to children in New York City public schools. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v.
State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that such allegations constitute a valid cause of action
and also that claims under Title VI were valid).
59. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983) (concluding
that the education clause, requiring thorough and efficient education, does not require equal
spending, and that the financing scheme survives a rational basis test).
60. See Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979) (concluding that the education clause.
which requires provision of a thorough and efficient education, does not require equalized
spending per pupil).
61. See Theodore M. Shaw, Missouri v. Jenkins: Are We Really a Desegregated Society?. 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 60 (1992) (noting that school districts that once intentionally segregated
students "have become plaintiffs in school desegregation cases, seeking Milliken II relief against
the state in an attempt to circumvent the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez and other cases").
62. See Ryan, supra note 20.
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As court-ordered desegregation enters its twilight phase, money
remains the primary issue. Through the trio of Dowell, Freeman, and
Jenkins, the Supreme Court, by establishing guidelines as to when a district
can be declared "unitary" and released from court supervision, has not so
gently urged district courts to begin the process of dismantling
desegregation decrees.63 District courts have responded by approving
termination agreements reached by school districts, the state, and civil
rights plaintiffs. These agreements typically call for the dismantling of
desegregation plans and thus a potential return to de facto segregated
neighborhood schools, in exchange for a large, one-time payment from the
state to the relevant school districts.' For example, school districts in
Prince George's County, Cleveland, Kansas City, Nashville, Dayton, and
Memphis have all agreed to terminate mandatory desegregation plans in
exchange for large payments from the state.s
As discussed in more detail below, although Milliken H cases have led
to short-term increases in funding, they generally have not succeeded in
boosting academic achievement. Although the empirical research regarding
Milliken 1I cases is somewhat sparse, it does not appear that such relief has
had much impact on student performance, in part because receiving school
districts have made little systemic effort to ensure that the money is used
efficiently and to enhance student performance.' Kansas City is the
prototypical example. Despite spending close to $1.5 billion in seven years,
the district failed to show much academic improvement among its students,
in part because the money was spent primarily on "physical goodies" such
as planetariums, greenhouses, and swimming pools.6' Given the lack of
63. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts. 503 U.S. 467 (1992);
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
64. See Bradley W. Joondeph, A Second Redemption?. 56 WASH. & LEE L REv. 169. 169
n.1 (1999) (noting cases in which federal courts returned control to local officials); see also Kerry
A. White, Boston Weighs Return to Neighborhood Schools. Euc. WK.. July 8. 1998. at 3
(describing a proposal to return to a neighborhood school system in Boston).
65. See Caroline Hendrie, Falling Stars, EDUC. WK.. Feb. 25. 1998. at 34; Caroline Hendrie,
In Indianapolis, Nashville, a New Era Dawns, EDUC. WK., July 8. 1998. at 8 [hereinafter Hendrie.
In Indianapolis] (describing how a combined city-county council agreed to provide S206.8 million
to a Nashville school district in exchange for ending a busing plan that began as a result of a 1955
lawsuit); Caroline Hendrie, Judge Decides State Funds for Desegregation To End in K.C.. EDUC.
WK., Apr. 2, 1997, at 1; Caroline Hendrie, Judge Ends Desegregation Case in Cleveland, EDUC.
WK., Apr. 8, 1998, at 3; Caroline Hendrie, Md. District Asks Court To End Busing, EDuc. WK.,
Aug. 7, 1996, at 7; Peter Schmidt, Desegregation Costs Pt Ga., Ohio Officials at Odds with
Districts, EDUC. WK., Mar. 18, 1992, at 20. One interesting exception to this trend is Indianapolis.
which reached a settlement to end interdistrict busing in which local housing officials, the state.
and the U.S. Department of Justice agreed to take a series of steps aimed at increasing the number
of low-income and minority families that can find housing in the suburbs. See Hendrie, In
Indianapolis, supra, at 9. In an unusual twist, the suburban districts, which were receiving inner-
city students (and the additional state funding that accompanied them), have been vigorously
opposing the termination of the desegregation decree. See id.
66. See ORFIELD ETAL., supra note 22, at 243. 254-61.
67. Id.
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evidence that Milliken II funding has improved academic achievement, it is
unlikely that states freed from court supervision will continue to fund
Milliken II districts at the levels required by desegregation decrees.6"
B. School Finance Cases
On the school finance side, commentators divide the litigation into
three phases (or "waves," as they are called in the literature). 69 The first
phase involved federal- and state-court challenges to education-financing
systems based on the Federal Equal Protection Clause. This phase was
short-lived, beginning with a successful challenge in 1971 to California's
financing scheme in Serrano v. Priest" and ending two years later with the
Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.7'
The second phase began shortly after Rodriguez (indeed, thirteen days
later), when the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill72 declared
the education-financing scheme in New Jersey unconstitutional on the
ground that it violated the state constitution's "thorough and efficient
education" clause. (The court hinted that the scheme might also violate the
state constitution's equal protection guarantee, but it has never resolved the
question in over twenty years of litigation.) The cases in this phase focused
on the education and equal protection clauses in state constitutions and
generally sought equalized funding per pupil.73 Court results in the second
68. See id. at 262; WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 12, at 336 (reporting that the removal of the
court order in the St. Louis desegregation case "would no doubt be the beginning of the end of
extra state resources to the city schools" and that, at most, "the St. Louis school board will be
bought off by the state with a set amount of money in return for agreeing to end the interdistrict
program"); Shaw, supra note 61, at 59 ("Whatever accomplishments nowed from the court-
ordered remedy may only be of passing significance depending upon when and how the school
district and the state are released from court supervision." ).
69. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 31, at 121-42 (describing the progression of school finance
litigation); Heise, supra note 31, at 1152-53 (describing three waves of school finance litigation);
Thro, supra note 31, at 598 n.4 (claiming to have invented the classification); Julie K. Underwood
& William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 IARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 517, 520-35 (1991) (describing school finance litigation theories).
70. Serrano 1, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (finding that wealth is a suspect classification and
education a fundamental right and striking down a property-based funding scheme on state and
federal equal protection grounds).
71. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental right and upholding an
unequal school finance scheme under rational basis review).
72. Robinson 1, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
73. See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983) (holding that the
financing scheme in question violates the state equal protection provision); Serrano v. Priest
(Serrano 1!), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (rejecting the legislative response to Serrano I on the
ground that it did not provide sufficient assurance of equalization, and holding that the legislative
scheme had to ensure that funding would vary no more than $100 per pupil); Horton v. Meskill
(Horton 1), 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) (holding that the state equal protection clause requires
substantial equality in funding education); Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler. 606 P.2d 3 10
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phase were mixed: Of the twenty challenges resolved by state supreme
courts, thirteen were rejected74 and seven were successful.'$ Even where
plaintiffs secured court victories, state courts were often vague and
deferential when it came to ordering remedies,76 and legislatures were often
(Wyo. 1980) (holding that the state finance scheme was in violation of the state equal protection
clause, on the ground that education is a fundamental right and wealth a suspect classification).
74. Challenges were rejected in the following states: Arizona. see Shofstall v. Hollins, 515
P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a financing scheme, despite
finding education to be a fundamental right); Colorado, see Lujan v. Board of Educ., 649 P.2d
1005 (Colo. 1982) (holding that education is not a fundamental right under federal or state
constitutions and that the state education clause does not require uniform expenditure levels);
Georgia, see McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981) (upholding a state financing
scheme, concluding that the "adequate education" clause requires more than minimum education
but that the legislature must determine the content of an adequate education): Idaho, see
Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975) (upholding a finance scheme against state
equal protection and education clause challenges); Maryland, see Hornbeck v. Somerset County
Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983) (rejecting a challenge based on the state equal protection
and education clauses and holding that the education clause does not require equal funding); New
York, see Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982) (upholding a finance scheme
on the ground that the education clause is not a mandate of equality and that education is not a
fundamental right); North Carolina, see Britt v. North Carolina Bd. of Educ.. 357 S.E.2d 432
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding a finance scheme on the ground that the "general and uniform"
education clause guarantees only equal access to school and that the "equal opportunity"
provision bars only racial segregation), dismissed on appeal. 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987): Ohio,
see Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979) (rejecting challenges based on state
equal protection and education clauses on the grounds that the legislature has discretion in
educational matters and that the court will not interfere with such discretion where education
appears adequate); Oklahoma, see Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987)
(rejecting a challenge based on state equal protection and education clauses and holding that the
education clause does not require equal funding); Oregon, see Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or.
1976) (holding that the state constitution requires the provision of only minimum educational
opportunities); Pennsylvania, see Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979) (rejecting a
challenge based on state equal protection and "thorough and efficient education" clauses); South
Carolina, see Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988) (rejecting an equalization
challenge based on the state's education and equal protection clauses); and Washington, see
Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974) (rejecting an equalization
challenge based on the state's education and equal protection provisions and concluding that the
adequacy claim was not supported by evidence), overnled by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State,
585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
75. Successful challenges were brought in the following states: Arkansas, see Dupree, 651
S.W.2d at 90; California, see Serrano 1, 487 P.2d at 1241; Serrano I1, 557 P.2d at 929;
Connecticut, see Horton 1, 376 A.2d at 359; New Jersey, see Robinson 1, 303 A.2d at 273;
Washington, see Seattle ScL Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 71 (overruling Kinnear and invalidating a
school finance scheme on the ground that the education clause requires the provision of a basic
education and requires the state legislature to define the scope of a basic education and provide
necessary funds); West Virginia, see Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984) (ordering
the implementation of a master plan but holding that educational standards set by a state board of
education were insufficiently specific to satisfy the constitutional mandate); Pauley v. Kelly, 255
S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that a school financing scheme must be adequate and equal,
based on the "thorough and efficient" education clause and the equal protection clause, and
remanding for development of standards); and Wyoming, see Herschler, 606 P.2d at 310
(invalidating a school finance scheme on the ground that it failed to provide substantially equal
funding).
76. See George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective on the
State School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 543, 544 (1994) (observing that "state supreme
courts show [a] pattern of expansive declarations of right and duty coupled with an insistence that
solutions must come from the legislative rather than the judicial branch").
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evasive or recalcitrant in response.7 7 New Jersey is a prime example, where
the legislature and the court, shortly after the first Robinson decision, began
a cat-and-mouse game regarding funding schemes and compliance with
court decrees that has continued through nine state supreme court decisions
and continues today.78 The same drawn-out process has transpired in Texas,
prompting Mark Yudof, former Dean of the University of Texas School of
Law, to observe that school finance reform "is like a Russian novel: it's
long, tedious, and everybody dies in the end."79
The third and current phase of school finance litigation began in 1989,
when plaintiffs won significant court victories in Kentucky" and
Montana."1 Although the third wave cases, as they are called, are not as
monolithic as commentators suggest,"2 they are for the most part
characterized by a strict focus on state education clauses and an emphasis
on adequacy rather than equity. The claim made, in other words, is not that
each student is entitled to equal funding, but rather that all students are
entitled to an "adequate" education and the funds necessary to provide it. 3
The shift in focus from equality to adequacy is in some cases a matter
of choice or strategy, and in other cases it is a matter of necessity, as
litigants who have already lost on an equality claim return to court for a
77. See Rebell, supra note 14, at 693. As Rebell notes.
[F]ew of the plaintiff victories have resulted in reforms that have demonstrably
ameliorated the inequities. Although inter-district disparities have been reduced in
some states, adverse results have followed many court interventions, and overall, the
record is disappointing. In some states, court orders have been virtually ignored, in
others, the courts have felt compelled repeatedly to strike down legislative responses
which were inadequate or unconstitutional or both.
Id. at 693-94 (citations omitted); see also Lewis B. Kaden, Courts and Legislatures in a Federal
System: The Case of School Finance, II HOFSTRA L. REV. 1205, 1255-59 (1983) (advocating
greater judicial involvement in the remedial phase of school finance litigation); Paul W. Kahn.
State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 459, 468 (1996)
(arguing that "successful litigation has more often been the product, not the cause, of a political
consensus that the schools need fundamental change" and that "[w]ithout such consensus. a state
court has limited ability to confront state political institutions"); Note, Unfulfilled Promises:
School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1072, 1072 (1991) (arguing that
"legislative inertia and unwarranted judicial deference to the political branches in the remedial
phase hinder the school finance plaintiff's prospects for securing a constitutional remedy").
78. See Ryan, supra note 20 (discussing the history of the New Jersey litigation).
79. Mark G. Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 499, 499 (1991).
80. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
81. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
82. The cases in Montana, Tennessee, Texas. and Vermont, for example, relied on equality
theories rather than adequacy theories. See id. at 684; Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter.
851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d
391 (Tex. 1989); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
83. See Thro, supra note 31, at 603 (observing that in the third wave of cases, " instead of
emphasizing equality of expenditures, the plaintiffs [typically] have argued that all children are
entitled to an education of at least a certain quality and that more money is necessary to bring the
worst school districts up to the minimum level mandated by the state education clause"): see also
Heise, supra note 31, at 1153 (stating that "the third wave illustrates the replacement of
traditional 'equity' court decisions with 'adequacy' decisions").
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second or third time. The results in the so-called third wave have also been
mixed, although the win-loss ratio, at eleven wins ' and eleven losses, 5 is
better than that of the second phase."6
84. Successful challenges have been brought in Alabama. see Opinion of the Justices. 624 So.
2d 107 (Ala. 1993) (directing the state senate to follow the trial court order, which called for a
new finance scheme); Arizona, see Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d
806, 814 (Ariz. 1994) (invalidating the system of funding school facilities after finding that the
funding scheme caused " gross disparities"); Kentucky, see Rose. 790 S.W.2d at 215 (invalidating
the "whole gamut" of the state's education system, including its financing structure, on the
grounds that it violated equality and quality requirements derived from the state constitution's
education clause); Massachusetts, see McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ. 615
N.E.2d 516, 524 (Mass. 1993) (holding that a property-tax-based financing scheme violated the
state education clause requiring the state to "'cherish" the public schools); Montana. see Helena
Elementary, 769 P.2d at 690 (holding that substantial funding disparities meant that -the State has
failed to provide a system of quality public education granting to each student the equality of
educational opportunity guaranteed under" the Montana Constitution); New Hampshire, see
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) (holding that the state violated its
constitutional duty to guarantee adequate education and funding); New Jersey, see Abbott v.
Burke (Abbott I1) 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (holding that the revised funding scheme still violated
the state education clause); Ohio, see DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (holding that
the state's public school financing system violated the state constitutional requirement of a
thorough and efficient state school system); Tennessee. see Tennessee Small Sch. Svs.. 851
S.W.2d at 139 (holding that a state finance scheme. which resulted in funding disparities and was
justified only by local control of education, violated the state equal protection clause); Texas. see
Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 398 (holding that the finance scheme violated the state's "efficient
system" education clause, which the court interpreted to require substantially equal access to
education funding); Vermont, see Brigham, 692 A.2d at 384 (holding that the financing scheme
violated the state constitution's education and common benefits clauses, which require the
provision of substantial equality of educational opportunity throughout the state).
85. Challenges were rejected by the following state supreme courts: Florida. see Coalition for
Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles. 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996) (rejecting the claim
that the state failed to provide an adequate system of public schools); Illinois, see Leis E. v.
Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 ( Ill. 1999) (holding that the state education clause does not guarantee a
minimally adequate education); Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar. 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Il1. 1996)
(rejecting challenges based on state education and equal protections clauses); Maine. see School
Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Commissioner, Dep't of Educ.. 659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995) (holding that
funding disparities bore a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest); Minnesota.
see Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (rejecting a challenge to a financing scheme
based on state equal protection and education clauses); Nebraska. see Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d
349 (Neb. 1993) (dismissing claims that spending disparities violated state constitutional rights on
the ground that the plaintiffs failed to allege that disparities caused educational inadequacies);
North Dakota, see Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. I v. State. 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994) (finding
that a school finance scheme failed to further the constitutional requirement of equal educational
opportunity, but upholding the scheme because the court lacked the supermajority required to
strike down legislation); Oregon, see Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116
(Or. 1991) (rejecting challenges based on state constitutional provisions on the ground that the
constitution presupposes the use of local revenues to fund schools); Rhode Island, see City of
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995) (holding that a system for financing public schools
did not violate the state constitution's equal protection and education clauses); Virginia. see Scott
v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994) (upholding a finance scheme against a challenge
based on the state education clauses after finding that education is a fundamental right but that the
constitution does not require equal funding or equal educational opportunity); Wisconsin, see
Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989) (rejecting a challenge based on the state equal
protection and education clauses and holding that education is a fundamental right but that equal
funding is not).
86. Again, however, it is important to recognize that four of the victories came in cases based
on equality, rather than adequacy, theories. See Helena Elementary, 769 P.2d at 684; Tennessee
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Interestingly, whereas most commentators sympathetic to the cause of'
integration have lamented the Court's decision in Milliken I and tend to
agree that the use of Milliken II remedies is a poor substitute for
integration, 7 school finance commentators generally have embraced the
shift to adequacy. In two recent articles, for example, Professors Michael
Heise and Peter Enrich both predict that adequacy will remain the
touchstone for future education cases, and they both argue that adequacy is
a more promising goal than equality in education finance reform litigation.
Their argument in favor of adequacy is essentially pragmatic: Heise and
Enrich contend that adequacy may simply prove to be more achievable than
equality, because it is less complicated a notion, more normatively
appealing, and does not conflict with the principle of local control.
Adequacy is also less costly, according to Professor Enrich, "especially for
the elites who derive the greatest benefits from the existing inequalities,
because adequacy does not threaten their ability to retain a superior
position." "
Whether adequacy suits will prove to be more lucrative than equality
suits for poor districts is an open question." The success of such suits rests
on a number of contingencies, none of which will be easy to satisfy,
including the establishment of standards or goals that are sufficiently high
to be meaningful; some understanding on the part of the legislature and the
courts regarding the inputs necessary to achieve the established standards;
Small Sch. Sys., 851 S.W.2d at 139; Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 391, Brigham, 692 A.2d at 384.
These victories suggest that the shift in theories may not in itself be responsible for the higher
success rate in "third wave" cases.
87. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 61, at 58-60.
88. Enrich, supra note 31, at 180.
89. The arguments put forth by Enrich and Heise. for example, are by no means
incontrovertible. As alluded to above, Enrich and Heise contend that adequacy is a more
promising goal for a number of reasons: It is less complex than equality and has a comparatively
greater appeal to norms of fairness and opportunity; it is less threatening and more consistent with
local control; there is a more explicit textual source for such a right; adequacy coheres with the
standards movement; and it appeals to urban districts that already receive relatively high levels of
funding. See id. at 166-70; Heise, supra note 31, at 1174-76. To respond briefly: Determining
what is an adequate education seems no less complex (and perhaps is more so) than determining
what is an equal education. At the same time, it is difficult to understand why adequacy is more
normatively appealing than equality. Adequacy may indeed be less threatening to other school
districts and more consistent with local control, but this seems an odd defense-intentional
segregation may also be less threatening and more consistent with local control. The textual
source argument seems false, if only because the language of most state education clauses is quite
vague. I would suggest that it is harder to find adequacy in "thorough and efficient." "general and
uniform," and "cherish" clauses than it is to find a principle of equality in the combination of
education and equal protection clauses. The best arguments marshaled by Enrich and Heise seem
to be that adequacy coheres with the standards movement and has the potential to provide more
money to urban districts, many of which already spend above statewide averages. But equalizing
funding is not inconsistent with the standards movement, and there is no guarantee that the right to
an adequate education will lead to more money for urban districts. Indeed, to the extent that it is
difficult to prove the relationship between money and student achievement, state funds to urban
districts that continually perform poorly may actually be in jeopardy under an adequacy standard.
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and a guarantee of enough funding to ensure that all students have a
realistic chance of achieving the determined goals?0 Although these
contingencies would be difficult to meet even if strong and sincere efforts
were made, there is reason to question whether such efforts will be
forthcoming.
This question arises from the fact that adequacy cases, like Milliken 11
cases, do not rely on any kind of tying relationship between and among
school districts. It has long been observed that the best way to ensure fair
treatment of a minority group is to align that group with the majority in
such a way that the majority cannot help or hurt itself without doing the
same to the minority group.9' As mentioned previously, this principle
underlay early desegregation and school finance cases. In both sets of cases,
however, ties that would bind districts have been weakened, and the trend
in both sets of cases has been to allow the boundaries of districts to remain
unchanged and urban districts to remain isolated by race and poverty.
Severing these ties takes away a powerful incentive of wealthier, suburban
districts to assure that poorer districts receive fair and adequate treatment.
In the desegregation context, it is already becoming apparent that when
court supervision ends, Milliken II funding is significantly diminished or
eliminated. It is difficult to envision a different outcome for adequacy
cases. Although the right to an adequate education is not temporally limited
as are Milliken II remedies, the fact that poorer districts must continually
rely on the courts for protection has already been demonstrated in states like
New Jersey, Texas, and Arizona. Continued court reliance is necessary
largely because school finance cases have done nothing to alter the
structure or boundaries of districts and have rarely tied the financial fates of
districts together. It seems plausible that court supervision over school
finance systems will wane, and once that occurs, it is unclear what
motivation legislatures will have to continue funding at levels previously
ordered by courts. As will be suggested below, this seems especially true
with regard to urban districts, for which additional funds have yet to
translate into significant improvements.
In sum, school desegregation and school finance litigation have
converged around money. That poor and minority schools will remain
separate from white and wealthier schools appears to be taken as a given,
and, if anything, is reinforced by the fact that advocates are fighting not
90. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court. 1968 Term-Foreivord: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7. 58-59 (1969).
91. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) ("The framers
of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical
guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.") (Jackson, J..
concurring); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); Liebman. supra note 13. at 362;
Michelman, supra note 90, at 53-54.
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over integration but resources. Faith has been placed, by necessity in some
cases and by choice in others, in the power of resources to improve the
educational opportunities of children attending racially and
socioeconomically isolated schools. There are reasons, however, for
questioning that faith, and it is to those reasons that this Article turns.
III. THE CREATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF GHETTO SCHOOLS
The schools and school districts that have been shaped by race and
racial politics and that may be beyond the reach of school finance reform
are mostly urban. Roughly two-thirds of black students attend elementary
and secondary school in central-city districts. These central-city schools, in
turn, are populated primarily by minority students-both African-American
and Hispanic.92 In this Part of the Article, after describing the
characteristics of urban schools in some more detail, I explore the creation
and current pathologies plaguing such schools. I explain how residential
segregation and the Court's desegregation jurisprudence, which themselves
are at least partially the product of poor race relations, have combined to
create urban schools that are isolated by race and poverty. Such schools are
more expensive to run and, at the same time, suffer from problems that
money seems unable to solve. In this way, race has played a pivotal role in
creating schools whose problems seem irremediable by school finance
reform and increased expenditures.
A. Urban Schools: The Numbers
Four general characteristics set urban schools apart from their suburban
counterparts: student composition, student poverty, student performance,
and dropout rates. Urban public schools are attended primarily by African-
American and Hispanic students. In 1990-1991, for example, only 25% of
the students enrolled in the largest forty-seven urban districts were white
92. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 62 (reporting that over half of all blacks in the
United States live within 30 large metropolitan areas); George C. Galster, Polarization, Place. and(
Race, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1439 (1993) ("Nationally, two-thirds of African-American students
and nearly half of other minority students attend primary and secondary schools in central-city
districts, whereas less than a quarter of white students do so."); Gary Orfield et al., Deepening
Segregation in American Public Schools 11 (Apr. 5, 1997) (unpublished paper prepared by the
Harvard Project on School Desegregation) (on file with The Yale Law Journal) (reporting that
67.1% of black students are in schools whose enrollment is less than 50% white, and that 33.6%
of black students are in schools whose enrollment is less than 10% white-that is, one-third of all
black students attend schools whose student bodies are 90% to 100% minority). As is already
apparent, this Article focuses on African-American and white students rather than students from
all ethnic groups. While recognizing that the student population is more diverse than this portrays,
and that the burgeoning Hispanic student population faces many of the same obstacles as do black
students, I limit my focus because of the unique history of white-black race relations in this
country and because of the greater amount of evidence regarding African-American students.
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(nationwide, whites made up 70.7% of student enrollment); 42.1% were
African-American; and 26.5% were Hispanic.9 3 The enrollment figures for
some cities are even starker. In 1995, 100% of the students in East St.
Louis, Illinois, and Compton, California, were minority, as were 96% of the
students in Washington, D.C., and Camden; 94% in Hartford, New Orleans,
and San Antonio; 93% in Los Angeles, Oakland, Atlanta, and Paterson;
92% in Richmond; 91% in Newark and Jersey City; and 83% of the over
one million students in the New York City public school system.' Urban
schools educate two-thirds of all African-American students, nearly half of
other minority students, but less than a quarter of white students." For
black students, then, much more than for white students, educational
opportunities "are intimately connected to inner-city districts in the largest
metropolitan areas." 
96
These educational opportunities are shaped by the second factor that
sets urban schools apart from their suburban counterparts: Students in urban
districts are disproportionately poor. Over half of the students in the largest
urban districts were eligible for a free or reduced lunch in 1990-1991,
which is the primary measure of student poverty and the one used to
determine Title I eligibility.97 The schools that have the highest minority
enrollment also have the highest incidence of student poverty: In 87% of
schools that are over 90% minority (African-American and Hispanic), over
half of the students come from families living in poverty. 9 The figures
from specific cities provide a more tangible glimpse into the depths of
urban poverty. As of 1995, 90% of the students in Compton and 80% of the
students in San Antonio were poor enough to be eligible for free lunch. In
Bridgeport, Atlanta, New Orleans, St. Louis, Camden, Jersey City, Newark,
and Paterson, over 70% of the students were so eligible, as were over 60%
of the students in Los Angeles, Oakland, Washington, D.C., Baltimore,
Detroit, Kansas City (Missouri), Jackson, Buffalo, Dayton, Providence, and
Dallas.99 Seen from the perspective of neighborhoods, the view is equally
startling. The U.S. Census Bureau defines "extreme poverty areas" as
93. See COUNCIL OF GREAT CITY SCH., NATIONAL URBAN EDUCATION GOALS: BASELINE
INDIcATORS, 1990-91, at xi (1992) [hereinafter NATIONAL URBAN EDUCATION GOALS]: see also
ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 61-63. To cite another, slightly outdated figure: As of 1986. the
25 largest urban school systems educated 27% of the country's African-Amcrican students but
only 3% of the white students. See Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on
Metropolitan Society, 80 MINN. L. REv. 825, 842 (1996).
94. See Craig D. Jerald & Bridget K. Curran. By the Numbers: The Urban Picture. EnUC.
WK., Jan. 8, 1998, at 56.
95. See Galster, supra note 92, at 1439.
96. Id
97. See NATIONAL URBAN EDUCATION GOALS. supra note 93. at xi. Title I is a federal
program ostensibly designed to provide monetary assistance to poor students and poor schools.
See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6514 (1994).
98. See Orfield et al., supra note 92, at 19.
99. See Jerald & Curran, supra note 94, at 64-65.
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neighborhoods where at least 40% of the residents are below the poverty
line."° Only 5% of the children in the United States live in such
neighborhoods. Yet in East St. Louis, 58% of the city's children live in
extreme poverty neighborhoods; in Camden, 50%; in New Orleans and
Detroit, 41%; and in Hartford, Atlanta, and Dayton, 30%.'0'
The third factor that sets urban schools apart is closely related to the
second: Urban school students generally do not perform as well on
standardized tests as students in either rural or suburban schools, and black
students in particular do not perform as well as white students.'02 Given the
strong connection between socioeconomic status and academic
performance, this fact is not surprising. But the sheer deficiency of urban
student performance is nonetheless shocking. According to a recent report
in Education Week, "[m]ost 4th graders who live in U.S. cities can't read
and understand a simple children's book, and most 8th graders can't use
arithmetic to solve a practical problem." 103 More than half of fourth- and
eighth-grade students attending urban schools do not even reach the most
basic proficiency level on national tests in such subjects as reading, math,
and science, which means that they likely cannot do grade-level work."° In
schools where a majority of the students are poor, the percentage of
students who do not perform at even the basic level on national tests rises to
at least two-thirds.'05 In non-urban schools, by contrast, the figure is nearly
the opposite: Two-thirds of the students score at least at the basic level on
national tests.1°6
Finally, dropout rates for urban schools are dramatically higher than
they are for non-urban schools. Dropout rates in all large, central-city
school districts significantly exceed the national average of 11%.""7 Among
the nation's forty-seven largest school districts, the average dropout rate is
100. Concentrated Poverty, EDUC. WK., Jan. 8, 1998, at 14.
101. See Jerald & Curran, supra note 94, at 62-63.
102. See, e.g., Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score Gap: An
Introduction, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 1, 1 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith
Phillips eds., 1998) (reporting that "the typical American black still scores below 75 per cent of
American whites on most standardized tests" and "below more than 85 per cent of whites" on
some standardized tests (footnotes omitted)).
103. Lynn Olson & Craig D. Jerald, The Achievement Gap, EDUC. WK.. Jan. 8. 1998, at 10.
104. See id. The figures are from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). a
federal testing program given to a randomized sample of students throughout the country. The
NAEP is generally thought to provide the best and most reliable data for state-by-state
comparisons of student performance. See id. at 12.
105. See id. at 10.
106. See id. at 12. When individual states are examined, the gap between urban and non-
urban schools can be quite dramatic: In Maryland, for example, only 9% of urban eighth-grade
students scored at the "basic" level or higher on the NAEP in mathematics, compared to 63% of
the students in non-urban districts; in New Jersey, 73% of fourth-grade students perform at least at
the basic level in reading on the NAEP, whereas only 27% of those in urban districts do. See id. at
I1. These examples are by no means exhaustive. For a table of the largest gaps between urban and
non-urban districts, which lists the gaps in reading, math, and science in nine states, see id.
107. See Galster. supra note 92, at 1423.
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nearly twice the national average." 5 Again, a sharper focus on particular
states and cities reveals the depth of the problem. In New Jersey, for
example, dropout rates in urban high schools were as high as 31.2% in
1995-1996 and have in the last ten years reached as high as 47%.")' In the
St. Louis public school system, 400 more African-American students
dropped out of high school during 1990-1991 than graduated."' Other large
inner-city districts report similarly high numbers,"' and when broken down
into particular schools and neighborhoods, the numbers become
astonishing. In Chicago, for example, the dropout rate for children who
begin their education in certain elementary schools has climbed in recent
years to as high as 86%.112
B. Creating Ghetto Schools: Residential Segregation and Milliken I
Today's urban schools are not the product of accident, unadulterated
preference, or simple economics. Rather, urban schools have been largely
shaped by two complementary forces: residential segregation and the
Court's decision in Milliken I. Residential segregation and particularly the
exodus of middle-class whites from central cities have served not only to
isolate African-American students, but also to concentrate the effects of
poverty in densely populated urban neighborhoods and thus in the public
schools in those neighborhoods. Milliken I essentially immunized suburban
schools from the reach of desegregation plans, thereby cutting off access to
wealthier school systems and providing a "safe" haven for middle-class
families seeking to exit urban schools. These factors are discussed in turn.
108. See NATIONAL URBAN EDUCATION GOALS. supra note 93. at xvi.
109. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417. 433 n.22 (NJ. 1997) (citing Abbott II,
575 A.2d 359 (NJ. 1990)); see also PHILIP BURCH. THE DROPOUT PROBLEM IN NEW JERSEY'S
BIG URBAN SCHOOLS: EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY AND GOVERNMENTAL INACTION at ix (1992)
(noting that "there are really zwo school systems in New Jersey--one consisting of most suburban
and rural districts, which have relatively low dropout rates and few major academic problems; the
other consisting of a much smaller number of big, needy urban districts, many of which have
[four-year] dropout rates of from 40 to 60 percent"); EDUCATION LAw CTR.. WIPING OUT
DISADVANTAGES 3 (1996) [hereinafter WIPING OUT DISADVANTAGES] (stating that poorer. urban
high schools in New Jersey have dropout rates of 40% to 50%).
110. See WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 12. at 337.
111. See Jerald & Curran, supra note 94. at 66-67. Sometimes urban districts will under-
report dropout rates for political or financial reasons. It is thus difficult to obtain truly accurate
rates and fair to assume that the reported numbers will not overestimate the dropout rates and will
occasionally underestimate those rates. For a discussion of the difficulties in obtaining a precise
dropout figure for New York City Schools. see JONATHAN KOZOL. SAVAGE INEQUALITIES:
CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 112-13 (1991).
112. See KOZOL, supra note I ll, at 58.
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1. Residential Segregation
The long and complicated history of residential segregation has been
explored elsewhere and need not be recounted in detail here."' To
understand the limitations of school finance reform, however, it is
necessary to describe briefly the current extent, historical explanations, and
continuing consequences of residential segregation."
14
The most important demographic factor affecting urban schools, which
dwarfs all others, is the intense residential segregation among blacks and
whites in metropolitan areas. This segregation began at the turn of this
century as Southern blacks migrated to Northern cities; it became
substantial in the 1940s, grew entrenched in the decades that followed, and
remains remarkably high today." 5 Because most public school students are
assigned to schools in the neighborhoods-or at least in the
municipalities-in which they reside, residential segregation typically
means school segregation. And residential segregation abounds.
Indeed, extensive residential segregation exists in nearly every
metropolitan area in the country. A common gauge of segregation is the
dissimilarity index, which measures the percentage of persons who would
have to move in order for neighborhoods to reflect the proportion of blacks
in a given geographic area." 6 The higher the index, the more intense the
segregation. In 1990, the average dissimilarity index for Northern cities was
77.8%; for Southern cities it was 66.5%.' 17 Although these averages are
down a few percentage points from the 1970 figures, they are still higher
than any level ever recorded for any other racial or ethnic group." 8 In
sixteen large cities, moreover, blacks live under what Massey and Denton
call "hypersegregated" conditions: They live in large contiguous
settlements of densely inhabited neighborhoods that are clustered around
the centers of cities." 9 In these cities-which include Atlanta, Baltimore,
113. See generally ARMOR, supra note 22, at 117-53; KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); MASSEY & DENTON, supra
note 2; MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND
STABILITY (1997); GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS: POLITICAL
FRAGMENTATION AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION (1991).
114. See generally Florence Wagman Roisman, The Lessons of American Apartheid: The
Necessity and Means of Promoting Residential Racial Integration, 81 IOWA L. REv. 479 (1995)
(reviewing MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2. and discussing the extent, causes, and
consequences of segregation).
115. See ARMOR, supra note 22, at 127; JACKSON, supra note 113. at 190-230. 289-90. 300-
01; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 19-82, 221-22; Roisman, supra note 114, at 481.
116. See ARMOR, supra note 22, at 127-28; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 63.
117. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2. at 222 tbl.8. I.
118. See id. at 66-67; see also id. at 2 ("No group in the history of the United States has ever
experienced the sustained high level of residential segregation that has been imposed on blacks in
large American cities for the past fifty years.").
119. See id. at 74-78.
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Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New York, Newark,
Philadelphia, and St. Louis, and which together house one-third of all
African Americans-blacks are not likely to see whites in their own
neighborhoods, the ones adjacent to theirs, or the ones adjacent to those; in
short, they are likely to have little direct contact with the rest of American
society.' 20 Finally, just as no other group has historically experienced the
same isolation as have blacks, no other contemporary group, including poor
Hispanics, even approaches the level of isolation currently experienced by
African Americans.
2'
Significantly, the residential segregation that exists in metropolitan
areas does not typically occur within the same towns or municipalities, but
rather occurs between municipalities.' Residential segregation most often
and most dramatically tracks the line between city and suburb. In the last
forty years, whites have left the cities for the suburbs in droves, leaving
behind cities increasingly dominated by minorities, primarily blacks and
Hispanics. By the end of the 1970s, the pattern of a black urban core
surrounded by a ring of white suburbs had become common, and it has
persisted.'23 As of 1990, for example, in six of the eight largest cities in the
country (all with populations over one million) minorities made up over
half of the population; the same is true in eight of the fourteen cities with
120. See id. at 75, 77. As Massey and Denton note: "Ironically, within a large, diverse, and
highly mobile post-industrial society such as the United States, blacks living in the heart of the
ghetto are among the most isolated people on earth." Id. at 77.
121. See id. The overall lack of change in integration levels does mask some important
variations. Since 1970, there have been significant declines in black segregation in some small
and mid-sized metropolitan areas in the South and West. particularly those with relatively small
black populations, while segregation has continued unabated in larger metropolitan communities.
particularly those in the Northeast and Midwest. See id. at 109-10. Even in the fimited context of
large metropolitan areas, there are differences between the South and North: In the 1980s, six of
the 12 Southern metropolitan areas with the largest black populations experienced modest
declines in segregation, while very little change occurred in Northern metropolitan areas. See id.
at 221-22 & tbl.8.1. When these statistics are taken together, then, it appears that integration is
more likely to occur in Southern metropolitan areas, especially in areas that have small black
populations. See hL at 110, 223; see also Reynolds Farley & William H. Frey. Changes in the
Segregation of Whites from Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Integrated
Society, 59 AM. Soc. REV. 23, 38-40 (1994). For a collection of sources and a discussion of
competing explanations for these trends, see Roisman. supra note 114. at 484-87.
122. This fact is significant in part because a large chunk (usually close to 50%) of school
funds comes from local property taxes, and thus residential segregation within the same town
would have less impact on school finance than does the existing residential segregation between
poorer and wealthier towns. See Robert C. Johnstone & Jessica L. Sandham. States Increasingly
Flexing Their Policy Muscle, EDUC. WK., Apr. 14, 1999, at 1.
123. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, Racial Change and Social Policy, 441 ANNALS OF AI.
ACAD. POL. SCI. 114, 122 (1979). Pettigrew found that, as of 1974. blacks were twice as likely as
whites in metropolitan areas to live inside the core city rather than in the suburbs. As he stated
then, in an observation that is still relevant and accurate: "This doubled proportion of blacks in
central cities is the basic fact underlying the spatial maldistribution of the races: and it is the
largest single reason for the vast residential separation of black and white citizens in America
today." kI. at 122; see also MASSEY & DENTON. supra note 2, at 67-74 (discussing trends in
suburbanization and segregation since 1970).
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populations between 500,000 and one million.14 Indeed, racial segregation
between cities and suburbs is so great that social scientists find that "it is no
longer appropriate to measure segregation within cities alone." 15
Although middle-class blacks have also left the city in the last couple of
decades, the rate of black suburbanization does not come close to that of
whites, and the percentage of blacks in suburbs as opposed to central cities
is tiny. 2 6 As of 1990, for example, African Americans constituted only
8.7% of suburban residents in twelve of the largest metropolitan areas in the
country, including New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit,
St. Louis, and Boston.1 7 Even within the suburbs, there is a good deal of
residential segregation, with blacks living primarily in older suburbs closest
to urban areas and in well-defined sections of more distant suburbs.' 8
While there is hardly room to debate the extent of residential
segregation, there are ample grounds for disagreement regarding the
historical and continuing causes of that segregation. There is consensus,
however, that four factors have played a role: public discrimination, private
discrimination, preferences, and income (or socioeconomic status). More
precisely, there is consensus that residential segregation has been
encouraged by public and private discrimination against blacks; that current
residential segregation can be partially but not completely explained by
preferences; and that current residential segregation can be partially but not
completely explained by economic differences between whites and
blacks. 2 9 Beyond this basic consensus, a fair bit of disagreement persists as
to how these various causal threads have interacted and which ones have
been or continue to be the most influential. 30
Rather than attempt to disentangle this causal web, which is probably
impossible in any event, it is sufficient for the purposes of this Article to
note that all of the various explanations regarding the creation and
maintenance of residential segregation, save one, point to race relations as a
crucial factor.' Public discrimination and private discrimination, of course,
124. See ANYON, supra note 13, at 4.
125. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 61.
126. See id. at 67-74.
127. See ANYON, supra note 13, at 4.
128. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 69-70; see also John Charles Boger, Race and
the American City: The Kerner Commission in Retrospect-An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REv.
1289, 1310-13 (1993) (noting that in many suburbs, most black households are located in
majority-black areas).
129. See ARMOR, supra note 22, at 117-53; JACKSON, supra note 113, at 283-305; MASSEY
& DENTON, supra note 2, at 83-114.
130. Compare, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 88-96 (arguing that preferences
play a small role in African-American segregation), with ARMOR, supra note 22. at 141 (arguing
that preferences play a large role).
131. That race is the key factor in residential segregation is also persuasively demonstrated
by the differing levels of segregation for Caribbean Hispanics, a group that consists mainly of
Puerto Ricans and Cubans but also includes Dominicans and Panamanians. Caribbean Hispanics
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operate on the basis of race. Preferences for living within a single racial
group also operate on the basis of race and on the basis of perceived
differences and prior history between blacks and whites. The only factor
that does not operate directly on the basis of race is economics or
socioeconomics, but the available empirical evidence indicates that income
level and socioeconomic status explain only a small portion of the existing
residential segregation.'32 That race relations remain a paramount and direct
cause of residential segregation carries important implications for school
finance litigation and school desegregation, to which I will turn below.
Before addressing those implications, however, some attention must be paid
to the impact that residential segregation has had on African-American
urban communities.
The primary consequence of the residential segregation of African
Americans in urban communities has been the concentration of poverty and
the deleterious conditions that tend to accompany it. As William Julius
Wilson and other scholars have noted, the restructuring of urban economies
in the 1970s resulted in the loss of manufacturing and industrial jobs in
cities and their replacement with lower-paying service-sector jobs.'33
Combined with rising inflation, this urban restructuring drove up already
high rates of black poverty, and this poverty was concentrated because of
extremely high levels of residential segregation. The movement of middle-
class blacks out of inner cities aggravated these endemic economic changes,
share a similar cultural background but display a wide variety of racial characteristics and
identities. Some consider themselves white, some black, and others of mixed race. Massey and
Denton examined segregation levels among Hispanics in 10 metropolitan areas and calculated
those levels for three racial groups: white Hispanics. mixed-race Hispanics. and black Hispanics.
They found that white Hispanics were the least segregated, black Hispanics the most segregated.
and that mixed-race Hispanics fell in between, just as one would expect if race were the salient
factor in residential segregation. See MASSEY & DENTON. supra note 2. at 113-14.
132. See George C. Galster & W. Mark Keeney, Race. Residence. Discrimination. and
Economic Opportunity: Modeling the Nexus of Urban Racial Phenomena, 24 URB. AFF. Q. 87,
92-93 (1988) (discussing the scholarly literature and concluding that "the evidence shows that in
most cases only a small fraction of the observed extent of racial segregation can be explained on
'class' grounds"). That income levels cannot completely explain residential segregation is
apparent from the fact that blacks in metropolitan areas are highly segregated from whites, no
matter what their income. In Northern metropolitan areas, for example. blacks earning less than
$2500 in 1980 were only slightly more segregated than blacks earning more than S50.000. See id.
at 92-93. For Hispanics and Asians, by contrast, not only are overall segregation levels lower, but
those levels fall noticeably as income levels rise. Similar patterns are revealed when segregation
levels are correlated by job and education. Blacks are highly segregated at all socioeconomic
levels, while Hispanics and Asians become less segregated as socioeconomic levels rise. See
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 84-87. And, again, even when blacks do move to the
suburbs, there is evidence that they live in majority-black areas. See Boger, supra note 128. at
1310-13.
133. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 20-62 (1987); see also
John D. Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass, 501 ANNALS AI. ACAD. POL
& Soc. SdI. 26,28-33 (1989).
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although the extent and significance of this migration are the subject of
continuing debate.'34
Concentrated poverty, in turn, is often associated with ancillary ills.
such as the withdrawal of commercial and retail institutions, decaying
neighborhoods, high crime, high levels of drug use, welfare dependency,
high rates of joblessness, unwed childbearing, and the development of an
"oppositional" culture that devalues work and marriage and generally
inverts middle-class values.'35 There is, to be sure, a raging debate as to
whether concentrated poverty is solely or even primarily responsible for the
conditions of social decay in black neighborhoods. 36 But it is obvious that,
whatever the causal connection, residential segregation has served to
concentrate these deleterious conditions in black neighborhoods and has
created an environment for black children wherein "drug use, joblessness,
welfare dependency, teenage childbearing, and unwed parenthood... are
not only common but the norm." ' The concentration of poverty, the
conditions of social decay, and especially the emergence of an oppositional
culture all have a profoundly negative effect on the public schools in
African-American neighborhoods, as I shall explain below.
2. Milliken I
The second piece of the urban school puzzle is Milliken 1, "8 in which
the Court held, as described above, that an interdistrict desegregation
remedy could not be ordered without proof of an interdistrict violation. This
holding made it extremely difficult for desegregation plans to extend
beyond the reach of central cities and to include suburban schools, at least
in the North and West where school districts are typically coterminous with
134. Compare MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 240 n.28, 116-18, 144-45 (arguing that
evidence of black middle-class out-migration is inconclusive and that such migration did not
affect concentrated poverty in inner-city neighborhoods), with WILSON, supra note 133. at 49-62
(arguing that concentrated poverty arose in the inner cities because middle-class blacks left in the
1970s); see also Roisman, supra note 114, at 500-06. Moreover, Boger explains that. while a
significant number of blacks did move to the suburbs between 1968 and 1993,
the moves of African-American suburbanites most often led them not to "white" or
racially integrated suburbs, but instead to older, near-city suburbs where residents are
predominantly black or that quickly undergo racial transition to majority-black status
after racial integration begins. Thus, suburban blacks in 1993 typically find themselves,
as in yesterday's cities, residentially segregated from the white majority.
Boger, supra note 128, at 1312-13.
135. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 130-147, 165-185; see also JENNIFER L.
HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA 65, 172 (1984); WILSON, supra note 133, at 49,
55-62; Johnson, supra note 5, at 1411-12; Roisman, supra note 114, at 499-500.
136. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 3-9 and sources cited therein: John 0.
Calmote, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a Stone of flope from a
Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1246-49 (1995).
137. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 13.
138. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 717.
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municipal boundaries. (In the South, school districts often encompass entire
counties and thus include both central cities and their suburbs.) 39 Although
a significant number of Northern and Western cities intentionally
segregated students and thus were ordered to desegregate, Milliken I
typically precluded extending desegregation remedies to suburban
districts.140
The consequences of this limitation cannot be gainsaid, and, indeed, it
does not seem an exaggeration to identify Milliken I as second only in
importance to Brown I among the Court's school desegregation decisions."'
As a result of Milliken I, and in light of existing patterns of residential
segregation, desegregation plans confined to urban areas could not achieve
significant levels of integration because, as mentioned earlier, there simply
were not enough white students left in most urban school systems. "2 The
white students that remained, moreover, were typically poor themselves and
often attended inadequate schools. Busing students within the city thus
often meant transporting poor white and poor black students from shoddy,
single-race schools to shoddy, integrated schools. Boston is a revealing
example, where poor black students from Roxbury were bused to South
Boston High, which was previously attended primarily by poor, white, Irish
Catholics.'43
Limiting desegregation remedies in this way only heightened
opposition and a sense of unfairness among the whites forced to
139. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.. 402 U.S. 1. 9-10 (1971)
(describing a Southern school district that encompassed both the city and the surrounding county).
140. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 30 (-Milliken meant that there would be no
remedy for unconstitutional segregation in much of metropolitan America."); Chemerinsky. supra
note 18, at 1010-11. Since Milliken I, only four courts have ordered interdistrict desegregation
remedies: Indianapolis, see United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.
1980); Little Rock, see Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. I. 778 F.2d
404 (8th Cir. 1985); Louisville, see Newburg Area Council v. Board of Educ.. 510 F.2d 1358 (6th
Cir. 1974); and Wilmington, Delaware, see Evans v. Buchanan. 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978). But
see Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ.. 90 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1996) (declaring
Wilmington schools unitary). A federal court in St. Louis approved a settlement involving
voluntary interdistrict busing. See Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984). For a
fascinating account of the St. Louis desegregation plan, see WELLS & CRAIN. supra note 12.
141. J. Harvie Wilkinson, for one, called the case of "signal" importance and suggested that
the Justices could reasonably have feared that "Milliken ... might one day be regarded as this
century's Plessy v. Ferguson." WILKINSON, supra note 38, at 218, 228; see also ORFIELD ET AL.
supra note 22, at 10 (arguing that " [t]he impetus of Brown and the civil rights movement for
desegregating American schools hit a stone wall with the 1974 Milliken, v. Bradley decision"); id.
at 33 (arguing that "Milliken and the recent desegregation decisions of the 1990s echo some of
Plessy's basic themes and employ arguments paralleling some of those used to justify an end to
Reconstruction-era civil rights law").
142. Detroit is a perfect example. See Milliken 11. 433 U.S. at 271-72 & n.3 (discussing the
racial composition of the Detroit school district); see also Orfield. supra note 93, at 842 (noting
that in 1986, 25 of the largest school systems contained 30% of the nation's Latino students, 27%
of African-American students, and only 3% of white students).
143. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 135, at 55; J. ANTHONY LUCAS, CoMoN GROUND 17
(1985).
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participate.'" The limitation also provided a perfect incentive for continued
white flight from central cities. Much has been written regarding the link
between desegregation and white flight, with little agreement on the precise
impact that the former has had on the latter. 45 There is ample evidence to
support the argument that desegregation plans themselves often added to
existing patterns of white flight. 146 But there is also evidence demonstrating
that white suburban flight is an independent phenomenon and has occurred
in cities, such as New York and Atlanta, whose schools have never
undergone desegregation.'47 What seems plain, however, is that Milliken !,
combined with earlier decisions requiring busing within city districts,
unintentionally encouraged white flight with both carrot and stick. 4' As
Professor Jeffries has explained, busing within the cities displaced white
students from their neighborhood schools and thus gave middle-class
whites a reason to leave; refusal to include the suburbs in busing plans, in
turn, protected white suburbs and thus gave middle-class whites a place to
go.
149
Empirical evidence bears out this hypothesis. Cities that have
undergone city-only desegregation plans generally have also experienced
greater degrees of white flight than have cities involved in a metropolitan-
wide desegregation plan. 50 Although the evidence concerning the precise
144. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 135, at 57, 69; WILKINSON, supra note 38, at 193-215.
145. See, e.g., ARMOR, supra note 22, at 174-80; CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL, THtE CARROT OR
THE STICK 65-71 (1990).
146. See, e.g., ARMOR, supra note 22, at 174-94. Armor concludes from the evidence that
school desegregation contributes to white flight and that the flight can be quite large for
some school systems, especially those systems that are larger, have higher minority
concentrations, and have suburban or private school systems that can serve as
alternatives for those who flee a desegregation plan or for new residents who want to
avoid one.
Id. at 180. County-wide plans, by contrast, which encompass both city and suburb. are usually
associated with much less white flight. See infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text; see also
ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 316-17 (noting that two of the largest county-wide districts
with mandatory desegregation plans, Charlotte and Raleigh, North Carolina, have had a rising
proportion of white students in recent years and also have been growing rapidly in the 1990s).
147. See School Desegregation: A Social Science Statemement, in Brief of the NAACP,
DeKalb County, Georgia in support of respondents Pitts et al., at 6a-7a, Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467 (1992) (No 89-1290) [hereinafter Social Science Statement]; ARMOR, supra note 22, at 72.
209; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 135, at 60, 61; ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 94-95
(discussing, inter alia, the fact that Atlanta never bused but nonetheless became nearly nine-tenths
black).
148. See JEFFRIES, supra note 38, at 318; see also ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22. at 96
(noting that the least stable desegregation plans are "those that involve mandatory desegregation
in heavily minority central cities surrounded by unaffected white suburbs," which is "precisely
the kind of plan the courts were requiring because of the limitation in the Milliken I decision").
149. See JEFFRIES, supra note 38, at 318.
150. See, e.g., FINIG WELCH & AUDREY LIGHT, U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NEW
EVIDENCE ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 40 (1987). In the only study of desegregation funded by
the federal government during the Reagan years, a team of researchers examining the 125 largest
school districts found that desegregation plans halved the percentage of black students in all
minority schools during a period when housing segregation increased. The study also found that
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degree of comparative white flight varies, one study indicates that city
school districts lose up to twice the number of white students that
countywide districts lose when desegregation plans are implemented.' 5' The
reasons are not hard to fathom: The more extensive the desegregation plan,
the harder and more costly it becomes to escape. Moving to the suburbs will
not enable parents to avoid a metropolitan-wide desegregation plan, and
moving beyond the suburbs is often impractical for employment reasons.
Private schools thus become the only alternative, but these are relatively
costly and have traditionally drained far fewer white students from urban
public schools than has suburbanization1
5 2
From an educational standpoint, the more significant consequence of
the limitations imposed by Milliken I has to do with class rather than race.
Closing off the suburbs meant that city schools would be dominated by
more geographically extensive remedies had greater impact, without concomitant increases in
white flight. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 135, at 64; ORFIELD ET AL. supra note 22. at 316
(" [T]he proportion of white students remains much more stable in a number of districts with
countywide city-suburban mandatory desegregation."); WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 12, at 71;
Orfield, supra note 93, at 831. But see Christine H. Rossell. An Analysis of the Court Decisions in
Sheff v. O'Neill and Possible Remedies for Racial Isolation, 29 CONN. L REV. 1187, 1208-17
(1997) (disputing the significance of the city-versus-metropolitan distinction and arguing that the
key distinction is between mandatory and voluntary plans). Although Rossell concedes that
mandatory desegregation plans over a large geographic area show nearly 10% less white flight
over time than do similar plans covering smaller geographic areas, she argues that data tend to
support the position that voluntary desegregation plans produce the least white flight and that
mandatory desegregation plans-whether city-only or metropolitan-produce the most. See id. at
1212, 1214; see also Christine H. Rossell & David J. Armor, The Effectiveness of School
Desegregation Plans, 1968-1991, 24 AM. POL Q. 267 (1996). Although Rossell's point that the
voluntary-mandatory distinction is crucial is well taken, it is significant that she and David Armor,
the two leading critics of mandatory desegregation, agree that city-only plans lead to greater white
flight than do metropolitan plans.
151. See Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley. Understanding White Flight and Doing
Something About It, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 157, 166 (Willis D. Hawley ed.,
1981). Rossell's position regarding the relationship between desegregation and white flight has
changed through the years, from arguing that school desegregation is not a significant cause of
white flight to concluding that it is. See ARMOR, supra note 22. at 176. Her position regarding the
significance of metropolitan-versus-city-only plans also appears to have changed. Again, the
important point to draw from the shifting positions and conflicting studies is that, despite debate
about the degree of difference, there appears to be consensus that metropolitan plans do in fact
result in less white flight than do city-only plans.
152. See ORFELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 61-63; see also Gerald E. Frog, City Services, 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 23, 61 n.115 (1998) (noting that there has been no major shift overall of whites to
private schools). This is not to deny that there has been white flight to private schools. Although
obtaining precise or comprehensive figures is difficult, white flight to private schools has certainly
occurred (and continues to occur), as demonstrated by the discrepancy between the percentage of
whites or white children living in certain urban areas and the percentage of white students in
urban schools. In Boston, for example, 60% of the population is white, but only 15% of the public
school students are white; in New Orleans, the population is 35% white, while the student
enrollment in public schools is only 6% white. Again, however, white flight to private schools has
been small in comparison to white flight to the suburbs, both because white flight to the suburbs
has left relatively few whites in cities and because private schools (obviously) cost money. In
Mississippi, for example, a large number of white families have moved from Jackson to
predominantly white suburbs, while relatively few have left Jackson public schools for private
ones. See State by State, EDUC. WK., Jan. 8, 1998, at 88.
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poor children, while suburban schools would be dominated by middle-class
children.'53 As explained in the next Section, the consequences of isolating
schools filled primarily with impoverished children have been disastrous.
C. The Costs of Isolation
Because minority students are disproportionately poor, racial isolation
and socioeconomic isolation (or isolation by class) typically go hand in
hand, and race and class clearly interact in the creation and pathology of
urban schools. But it is important to identify the distinct role that each
plays. Race relations, and more specifically residential segregation and the
limits of school desegregation, are primarily responsible for creating urban
schools that are racially isolated. To be sure, racial isolation itself carries
costs insofar as it plays a role in perpetuating racial segregation in
adulthood. But it is class--or, to be precise, the concentration of poverty-
that is largely responsible for the obstacles that urban schools face.'54 In
other words, although there are discrete costs associated with racial
isolation, the socioeconomic composition rather than the racial composition
of urban schools appears to present the most significant hurdle facing
education reformers.
As explained in this Section, the concentration of poverty within urban
schools has significant consequences for school financing and educational
achievement, for several reasons. First, students from impoverished
backgrounds have greater needs and thus cost more to educate. Schools
filled with impoverished students, therefore, generally will be costlier to run
than schools filled with middle- and upper-income students. Second, the
difficulties created by concentrated poverty in schools may not be best
addressed, and are perhaps irremediable, by increased expenditures. There
are theoretical reasons and empirical evidence to support this hypothesis.
Third, the fact that the schools themselves are located in poor
neighborhoods seems to exert a deleterious influence on the administration
of the school districts and to create a dynamic in which the schools are seen
as jobs programs as much as academic institutions. " ' The
maladministration of schools makes implementing reforms and spending
money wisely more difficult, which ironically both casts doubt on the
accuracy of the argument that money does not matter (because it is hard to
know if money matters when it is not spent properly) and gives great
political and popular strength to the same argument (because many urban
153. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 54; Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 1011- 12.
154. Cf ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 57; see also ARMOR, supra note 22, at 83-86
(concluding from empirical study that the "socioeconomic status of black families in the Hartford
area, not school segregation, is largely responsible for differences in academic performance").
155. See infra Subsection III.C.3.
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schools provide glaring examples of the apparent inefficacy of increased
expenditures).
1. Monetary Costs
Students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds come to school with
greater needs than their more advantaged peers. Such students suffer more
from malnutrition and poor health care; lack of parental involvement and a
nurturing, stimulating home environment; frequent changes of residence;
and exposure to violence and drug use.'56 As the New Jersey Supreme
Court explained in one of its school finance decisions, "With concentrated
poverty in the inner-city comes drug abuse, crime, hunger, poor health,
illness, and unstable family situations. Violence also creates a significant
barrier to quality education in city schools where often just getting children
safely to school is considered an accomplishment.""' As a result of these
obstacles, "[m]any poor children start school with an approximately two-
year disadvantage compared to many suburban youngsters. This two-year
disadvantage often increases when urban students move through the
educational system without receiving special attention." '
Greater needs require greater resources: Disadvantaged students simply
cost more to educate, requiring additional educational programs and non-
academic services such as health care and counseling.'59 It follows that
schools with large concentrations of impoverished students will face the
greatest educational costs, even before factoring in such additional services
as security or counseling, and even without considering the different prices
for educational goods and services in cities as opposed to suburbs or rural
areas."6 A number of state school finance systems recognize this fact and
156. See ORFtELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 54.
157. Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417, 433 (N.J. 1997). In Abbott 11, the court concluded that the
needs of students in high poverty districts exceeded those of suburban students. See Abbott HI. 575
A.2d 359, 400 (NJ. 1990). "Those needs," the court observed. -go beyond educational needs.
they include food, clothing and shelter, and extend to lack of close family and community ties and
support, and lack of helpful role models. They include the needs that arise from a life led in an
environment of violence, poverty, and despair." Id. Congress. too, has recognized as much. In its
statement of policy and purpose with regard to Title 1, a federal program that devotes resources to
high-poverty schools, Congress reported that - [c]onditions outside the classroom such as hunger.
unsafe living conditions, homelessness, unemployment, violence, inadequate health care, child
abuse, and drug and alcohol abuse can adversely affect children's academic achievement and must
be addressed through the coordination of services, such as health and social services." 20 U.S.C. §
6301(c)(2) (1994).
158. Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 434 (quoting findings of the administrative law judge); see also
CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y., YEARS OF PROMISE: A COMPREHENSIVE LEARNING STRATEGY FOR
AMERICA'S CHILDREN (1996).
159. See ANYON, supra note 13, at 6-7 ("The large percentages of [urban) students needing
special services or programs strain city school budgets. in some cases accounting for up to one
quarter of expenses." (citation omitted)).
160. See Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 434 (citing Abbott 1H. 575 A.2d at 359).
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provide additional funding to high poverty schools. 6 ' Title I of the original
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the largest federal investment in
education, is explicitly premised on this recognition and ostensibly provides
money to schools based on the percentage of disadvantaged students
enrolled. 162 And at least one state supreme court, in a school finance
decision, has made special provision for meeting disadvantaged students'
needs.
63
Given the strong connection between race and socioeconomics, the first
cost of racial isolation is in dollars and cents."6 Racially isolated schools
face higher costs than do racially mixed schools. They will thus often
typically require a greater-than-average amount per pupil to provide an
education that is comparable to the education provided in schools not
saddled with concentrated poverty.
2. Nonmonetary Costs and the Limited Efficacy of Increased
Expenditures
The second cost of racially isolated schools is more complex, and it is
not one that money seems capable of addressing. The cost stems from the
influence of peers and from the "oppositional culture" mentioned above. It
is intuitive to any parent, as well as to those who remember their own
experience in elementary and secondary school, that a student's peers will
exert a strong influence on the student's attitude toward and behavior in
school. Intuition in this instance coincides with social science evidence,
which demonstrates not only that a student's peers affect behavior, but that
they also affect academic achievement. James Coleman's famous,
mammoth, and controversial 1966 report, entitled Equality of Educational
Opportunity, is best remembered for asserting that an individual student's
161. The school finance schemes in Connecticut, Idaho, Indianapolis, Mississippi, Nebraska.
New Jersey, and Washington, among others, devote additional state aid to districts based on the
number of low-income students in those districts. See State by State, supra note 152, at 118, 14 1.
188, 195,204,263.
162. The Title I program was most recently reauthorized in the Improving America's Schools
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, tit. I, §101, 108 Stat. 3519 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301
(1994)). In its statement of purpose and policy, Congress recognized that "the most urgent need
for educational improvement is in schools with high concentrations of children from low-income
families." Id. § 6301(b)-(c).
163. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450, 473-74 (N.J. 1998); Abbott I1. 693 A.2d
at 433-37.
164. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 55. Orfield notes that schools that are
predominantly minority are 14 times more likely to have high concentrations of impoverished
students than are schools that are mostly white. As of 1991, there were 5047 schools that were
90% to 100% African-American and/or Hispanic. Of these, 57% were high-poverty schools.
meaning that over half of the students in these schools were poor. See id. By contrast. 96% of
predominantly white schools have a majority of students from middle-income families. See id.
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socioeconomic status is the greatest determinant of school success." 5 Less
remembered but equally important was the finding that the socioeconomic
status of a student's peers also exerts a significant influence on academic
performance. More precisely, Coleman found that "student body
characteristics" account for "an impressive percent of variance" in student
achievement, and that the influence appears greatest on students from
disadvantaged backgrounds. 66 Numerous studies since the Coleman report
have reached similar conclusions, and there now exists a well-developed
body of research that indicates that achievement levels depend not only on a
student's own socioeconomic status but also on the status of his or her
peers. 67
Coalescing with the general studies regarding the importance of one's
peers are studies regarding the effects of oppositional black culture on
educational achievement among black children. As discussed briefly earlier,
anthropologists and social scientists have identified a distinct culture in
many poor, black neighborhoods that is defined primarily by its opposition
to conventional middle-class "white" values. Anthropologists theorize that
subordinated minorities, such as black Americans, "develop a sense of
collective identity... in opposition to the social identity of white
Americans because of the way white Americans treat them in economic,
political, social, and psychological domains, including white exclusion of
165. See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH. EDUC.. & WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966). Coleman and his colleagues prepared the
report under the auspices of the U.S. Office of Education (the precursor to the current Department
of Education), which in turn had been directed by § 402 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to "conduct
a survey ... concerning the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities." Id. at iii. At
the time, the project was one of the largest ever undertaken in history; it gathered and analyzed
information regarding 570,000 pupils, 60,000 teachers, and 4000 school facilities. See id. at 557.
Additional studies support Coleman's findings regarding the importance of socioeconomic status
for student achievement, including, for example, SHELLEY DRAZEN, STUDENT ACHIEvEMENT
AND FAMILY AND COMMUNITY POvERTY: TwENTY YEARS OF EDUCATION REFORM (1992); KIM
KRUSE, THE EFFECTS OF A LOW SOCIOECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT ON A STUDENT'S ACADEMIC
ACHIEVEMENT (1996); and Geoffrey F. Schultz. Socioeconomic Advantage and Achievement
Motivation: Important Mediators of Academic Performance in Minority Children in Urban
Schools, 25 URB. REv. 221 (1993).
166. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 165, at 304.
167. See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE. POLITICS, MARKETS. AND AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 125-29 (1990) (finding that the socioeconomic status of a school exerts a statistically
significant influence on achievement, though it is less influential than student ability, school
organization, and parents' socioeconomic status); KRUSE. supra note 165: LAWRENCE
STEINBERG, BEYOND THE CLASSROOM: WHY SCHOOL REFORM FAILED AND WHAT PARENTS
NEED To Do (1996); Galster, supra note 92, at 1439-40 (observing that racial and economic
segregation among schools "place greater limits on the educational achievement and attainment of
poor children from African-American and Hispanic families because these children have less
contact with children from nonpoor families"); James S. Liebman. Voice, Not Choice. 101 YALE
L.J. 259, 267 n.40 (1991) (reviewing CHUBB & MOE, supra, and citing additional evidence of the
significance of peers on student achievement); Schultz. supra note 165. See generally LINDA
DACHA, EFFECTS OF COMMUNITY AND FAMILY BACKGROUND ON ACHIEVEMENT 32, 41 (1981)
(finding that variations in neighborhood quality are partially responsible for differences in
educational achievement and attainment both within and between racial groups).
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these groups from true assimilation. '168 Once established, the theory
continues, this oppositional culture becomes difficult to overcome because
it is closely tied to the minority's sense of collective identity and security.
"[I]ndividuals who try to behave like white Americans or try to cross
cultural boundaries or to 'act white' in forbidden domains [including
schools] face opposition from their peers and probably from other members
of the minority community." 69 Thus,
[i]f whites speak Standard American English, succeed in school,
work hard at routine jobs, marry, and support their children, then to
be "black" requires one to speak Black English, do poorly in
school, denigrate conventional employment, shun marriage, and
raise children outside of marriage. To do otherwise would be to
"act white." 170
This oppositional culture is not confined to the streets, but exerts an
influence within schools as well.
Anthropologists John Ogbu and Signithia Fordham have done the most
extensive and well-known work in this small but growing field, and they
have found that children in ghetto schools face tremendous peer pressure in
school to avoid academic success and the accompanying stigma of "acting
white." 171 Not surprisingly, the pressure to avoid success is most intense
168. Signithia Fordham & John U. Ogbu, Black Students' School Success: Coping with the
"Burden of 'Acting White,"' 18 URB. REV. 176, 181 (1986).
169. Id. at 182.
170. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 168.
171. See Fordham & Ogbu, supra note 168, at 191. Fordham and Ogbu conducted a study of
black students at a public high school in Washington, D.C. Among the attitudes and behaviors
black students identified as "acting white" and thus as taboo were speaking standard English.
working hard to get good grades or actually getting good grades, spending a lot of time in the
library studying, being on time, doing volunteer work, going camping or hiking, going to a
museum or a symphony, and listening to classical music. See id. at 186. Although Fordham and
Ogbu suggested that black students will avoid the burden of "acting white" in desegregated
settings as well, see id. at 199-200, more recent evidence from the St. Louis schools suggests that
the type of school may affect the degree of resistance to or avoidance of success, see WELLS &
CRAIN, supra note 12, at 172-73 (citing R.W. LISSITz, ASSESSMENT OF STUDENT PERFORMANCIi
AND ATTITUDE YEAR IV-1994: ST. LouTs METROPOLITAN AREA COURT ORDERED
DESEGREGATION EFFORT (1994)). Wells and Crain report the results of a survey in which black
students attending all-black city schools, rather than integrated magnet or suburban schools, were
most likely to agree that students who seem smart and do well will be disliked by their peers. See
id.
Fordham and Ogbu's conclusions have been challenged by Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig,
who argue, based on data from a national sample of 10th graders, that the alleged burden of
"acting white" is exaggerated and not supported by evidence regarding graduation rates,
attendance rates, and time spent on homework. See Phillip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, The Burden of
"Acting White": Do Black Adolescents Disparage Academic Achievement?, in THE BLACK-
WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 102, at 375, 390. Ronald Ferguson, in turn, has questioned
Cook and Ludwig's argument by suggesting that the data they use to measure black oppositional
culture are not the most indicative of adolescent norms-that is, black students may act in ways
that indicate an alienation from school, such as refusing to participate in class, which are not
captured in the data regarding attendance, homework, and graduation, upon which Cook and
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during adolescence, and Ogbu and Fordham report that young black
students intensely fear being labeled "Oreos" or "Uncle Toms" for
performing well in school or even speaking standard English. They further
report that students intentionally fail some courses or try to avoid getting
A's in order to avoid a denigrating label and rejection by their peers."
Given the lower expectations on the part of students and teachers alike that
already exist in most poor urban schools, the pressure not to succeed must
mean that many students do not even attempt to master the basic skills that
would enable them to become functionally literate.'
To the extent that a student's peers and the culture of a school exert
demonstrable influence on student achievement, simply increasing
expenditures in schools populated by poor students will not necessarily
affect achievement. The stronger the influence of peers on performance, the
less likely it is that money will make much of a difference-and the more
likely it is that changing the composition of the school will make a
difference. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, no experiments exist in
which this specific hypothesis has been tested to determine whether
negative peer influences, at some point, could be overcome by increased
expenditures. There is, however, some empirical evidence that suggests that
even substantial increases in school expenditures have little effect on
student achievement when the student composition remains predominantly
poor. And there is even more evidence, discussed in Part IV, to suggest that
students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds improve their academic
performance when they transfer to schools with students from more
advantaged backgrounds.
The evidence regarding the inefficacy of increased expenditures comes
in two types: anecdotal and statistical. The best-known anecdote regarding
the inefficacy of increased funding comes from the Kansas City, Missouri
School District. 74 The district court ordered the funding as part of a
Ludwig relied. See Ronald F. Ferguson, Conunent, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP.
supra note 102, at 375, 394.
172. See Fordham & Ogbu, supra note 168, at 187-98; see also Signithia Fordham.
Racelessness as a Factor in Black Students' School Success: Pragmatic Strategy or Pyrrhic
Victory?, 58 HARv. EDUC. REV. 54 (1988) (arguing that some black students develop a strategy
of "racelessness" to resolve conflicts between academic achievement and racial group
identification).
173. See, e.g., ANYON, supra note 13, at 7 (citing research demonstrating "that instruction in
inner city schools is often based on cognitively low-level, unchallenging, rote material"); James
E. Rosenbaum et al., IWzite Suburban Schools' Responses to Low-Income Black Children: Sources
of Successes and Problems, 20 URB. REV. 28, 30-32 (1988) (concluding. from interviews of
parents whose children transferred from city to suburban schools, that suburban Chicago schools
have higher standards and demand more from students than do city schools).
174. For extensive discussion of the relevant court decisions and their impact in the KCMSD.
see ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 241-63; see also Missouri v. Jenkins. 515 U.S. 70 (1995);
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
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desegregation remedy fashioned on the basis and authority of Milliken II.'"
The plaintiffs originally sought a metropolitan-wide remedy but were
denied their requested relief on the basis of Milliken 1.176 Having been
denied relief that would very likely have been cheaper and more
effective,'77 they were granted a bonanza of funds: Between 1987 and 1995,
more than $1.5 billion was devoted to KCMSD. The court required the state
to pay a bit more than half of this amount.
KCMSD spent the money converting all of the schools in the district
into magnet schools. District officials hoped that creating excellent schools
would lure white students from the suburbs and avoid creating a two-tiered
system in which additional resources would be devoted only to magnet
schools while traditional schools were left to founder. 178 The showcase was
the $32 million Central High School, which had been transformed into the
"Classical Greek and Computers" magnet. The school was equipped with a
gymnastics room, a wrestling facility, an indoor swimming pool (called,
naturally, the natatorium), and a fully equipped robotics laboratory. On staff
were not only traditional teachers and administrators, but also a full-time
weight trainer, a diving instructor, a gymnastics coach, and a fencing
instructor. Central High was not alone in devoting its funds to seemingly
extravagant items: Elsewhere in the district, different schools featured a
planetarium, a dust-free diesel mechanic's room, a working farm, and a
Model UN room.'79
The increased funding has resulted in per-pupil expenditures in
KCMSD that are close to twice the statewide average; in 1992, KCMSD
spent $7819 per pupil while the statewide average was $3972.80 The results
of the increased funding, however, have been modest at best. Students in all
grades appear to have improved their performance in absolute terms on
national tests, but on statewide tests their performance has not improved
relative to their peers in other school districts throughout the state.'8 '
175. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (holding that courts could order the funding of
remedial and compensatory education programs as part of a desegregation decree).
176. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), see also id. at 695. 698 (Lay.
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the district court's decision rested upon a "misunderstanding of
Milliken I" and that the district court had "erected an improper proof burden for the plaintiffs to
overcome").
177. District Judge Clark, who ordered the monetary remedies, later admitted that it would
have been "much easier to integrate the Kansas City schools" if he had kept the suburban districts
in, and that including the suburban districts would have obviated the need for "a lot of the capital
improvements." ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 247 (quoting Judge Clark).
178. See id. at 248 (quoting an interview with Arthur Benson, plaintiffs' attorney in Jenkins
v. Missouri).
179. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 77 (Kennedy, J., concurring); ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22. at
241.
180. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 22, at 252.
181. See id. at 256-61.
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A similar, if less dramatic, story can be told of Connecticut. As a result
of a school finance decision that found that all students had the right to a
substantially equal education, the Hartford School District has been funded
for the last several years at a level higher than surrounding suburban
districts."2 Despite this relatively high level of funding, Hartford, whose
student body is overwhelmingly minority and poor, still posted test scores
that were markedly lower than those in the suburban districts."' This lack
of improvement spurred the Sheff suit, in which plaintiffs claimed that a
substantially equal education includes not only equal funding but also an
integrated student body."s
Hartford and Kansas City are not alone. Case studies of districts
receiving Milliken II aid have concluded that despite increased funding,
Milliken II districts have not demonstrated much improvement in academic
achievement. 5 A recent study of the effects of the New Jersey litigation
similarly suggests that gains to students in urban minority districts have
been quite limited."s
This largely anecdotal evidence is supported by broader statistical
analyses of the relationship between expenditures and achievement. There
is ongoing debate in the social science and education-policy world
regarding this relationship-regarding, in other words, the degree to which
money "matters." James Coleman's 1966 report began this debate by
asserting that expenditure levels had a negligible impact on achievement."
Since that time, a number of researchers, Eric Hanushek chief among them,
have concurred in Coleman's analysis and have concluded that there is no
systematic relationship between school expenditures and achievementss
Of course, one potential explanation for the apparent lack of
relationship between spending and achievement is that money is not being
182. See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267. 1273 (Conn. 1996). The level of funding, it bears
noting, also greatly exceeds the national average. In 1993. for example. Hartford spent over S8000
per pupil; the national average was S5500.
183. See id. at 1272-74. For discussion of this case. see Ryan, supra note 16.
184. See Sheff, 678 A.2d, at 1271-72.
185. See ORFIELDETAL., supra note 22.at 256-61.
186. See Tractenberg, supra note 17. at 91-97 (describing the performance of urban minority
students on standardized tests).
187. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 165.
188. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., PROSPECTS: FINAL REPORT ON STUDENT
OuTcoMEs (1997); Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance "Refonn" May Not be Good Policy,
28 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 423, 427-30 (1991). The Prospects Report concerned schools receiving
Title I aid, which is designed to boost the achievement of disadvantaged students. The report
concluded that participants in the Title I program continued to score lower on standardized tests
than nonparticipants; that is, Title I did not close the gap that exists between low- and high-
achieving students. Other studies found that particular Title I programs were quite effective.
suggesting that Title I funds can make a difference if spent wisely. See David J. Hoff. Tracking
Title 1, EDUC. WK., Oct. 22, 1997, at 16 (discussing a 1993 RAND Corporation study concluding
that many Title I programs produce "outstanding results"). If the focus is only on disadvantaged
students, moreover, one study suggests that disadvantaged students who participate in Title 1
programs tend to perform better on tests than those who do not participate. See id.
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spent effectively.' 89 This point is made by researchers who disagree with
Hanushek and suggest that money spent wisely does matter. Professor
Ronald Ferguson, for example, has concluded that money spent on hiring
teachers with strong academic backgrounds, and specifically, strong reading
skills, is wisely spent, as there is a demonstrable relationship between
strong teachers and student achievement.19 In addition, a recent and
important experiment conducted in Tennessee indicates that reducing class
sizes has a positive effect on achievement, especially on the achievement of
disadvantaged students. 9 ' Finally, there is some evidence, albeit mixed,
that suggests that money devoted to certain systemic reforms does translate
into increased academic achievement.
92
189. This is the claim made by Alison Morantz with regard to Milliken II funds. See ORFIELD
ET AL., supra note 22, at 253-54. This same claim is made by Title I researchers. See, e.g., Robert
E. Slavin, How Title I Can (Still) Save America's Children, EDUC. WK.. May 21. 1997. at 54
(suggesting that Title I funds should be spent on whole-school reforms, such as the author's own
"Success For All" program).
190. See Ronald F. Ferguson, Can Schools Narrow the Black-White Test Score Gap?, in THF
BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 102, at 318, 365-66 (concluding that preschool
education, strong teachers, and smaller class sizes all have positive effects on academic
achievement); Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying for Public Education: New Evidence oi How and Why
Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465, 488-89 (1991) [hereinafter Ferguson, Paying for
Public Education]; Jencks & Phillips, supra note 102, at 44 (advocating cutting class size and
screening out teachers with poor academic skills as effective and realistic policies); see also
MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE 138-45 (1997) (discussing empirical
studies that suggest that particular interventions and expenditures-for example, hiring more
talented teachers, adopting whole school reform, and reducing class size-arc effective in
boosting achievement); Adam Gamoran, Resource Allocation and the Effects of Schooling: A
Sociological Perspective, in MICROLEVEL SCHOOL FINANCE: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
POLICY 207, 211-13 (David Monk & Julie Underwood eds., 1988) (arguing that teachers affect
achievement outcomes and that they are affected by resource allocations); Larry V. Hedges et al..
Does Money Matter?: Meta-Analysis of Studies of the Effect of Differential School Inputs of)
Student Outcomes, 23 EDUC. RESEARCHER 5 (1992) (criticizing the Hanushek review and finding.
after reviewing data from all available studies, that school spending had a positive and statistically
significant effect on achievement).
191. See David Grissmer et al., Why Did the Black-White Score Gap Narrow in the 1970s
and 1980s?, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 102, at 182. 214.
192. Most of the evidence relates to a particular systemic or whole-school reform, known as
"Success for All." This program was designed by Robert Slavin and his colleagues at Johns
Hopkins. Key components of the program include extended reading periods. small ability-grouped
classes for reading, one-on-one tutoring for students having difficulty in reading, and family
support services designed to increase parents' participation in their children's education. Although
there are similar "whole-school" reforms that seek to reorient the educational practices of entire
schools rather than simply provide remedial instruction for students most in need. see. e.g.,
Fashola & Slavin, supra note 13, at 372-78 (describing various programs). Success for All is the
most widely implemented and apparently the most promising. see. e.g.. Lynn Olson. Will Success
Spoil Success for All?, EDUC. WK., Feb. 4, 1998, at 42.
Assessments of the program have been contradictory, as suggested in the text. Robert Slavin.
obviously not a disinterested party, argues that longitudinal research indicates that Success For All
has educationally significant effects in the districts in which it has been implemented. See Fashola
& Slavin, supra note 13. Others question these findings and argue that the results are much more
modest than Slavin claims. See, e.g.. Herbert J. Walberg & Rebecca C. Greenberg, The Diogenes
Factor, EDUC. WK., Apr. 8, 1998, at 52 (questioning the accuracy of Slavin's claims and
describing an independent study that found that in Baltimore, where the program originated, the
Schools, Race, and Money
The debate over the extent to which "money matters" will not likely be
resolved soon and certainly not in this Article. It is sufficient for now to
make two observations. First, notwithstanding some promising statistical
evidence from a broad sampling of different types of schools, it is fairly
clear that increased expenditures in racially isolated and high-poverty
schools have not yet led to significant improvements in student
achievement.'93 Second, the studies support the intuitive position that
money spent poorly will not translate into academic gains, while money
spent wisely may indeed accomplish some academic improvement-
although just how much gain one can reasonably expect is far from clear 94
In short, the evidence indicates that increasing expenditures in racially and
socioeconomically isolated schools has not in the past been a very effective
strategy for assisting students; whether it will be in the future is at best
debatable and depends on whether the resources are spent wisely.
average Success for All student failed to reach grade-level performance by the end of the third
grade).
Granting for the moment that Slavin's claims are accurate, it is important to recognize the
baseline by which Slavin measures progress. He measures the effect of Success for All by
comparing the performance of students in the program with students from -similar" schools,
meaning schools with children from similar socioeconomic backgrounds, who are not in the
program. Selecting this baseline in itself reveals just how limited the nature of reform is exlected
to be in high-poverty schools, and it suggests that even the most promising and ambitious whole-
school reform does not claim that it will create high-poverty schools that achieve at the levels of
middle-class suburban schools. The idea that it would be futile to compare urban and suburban
schools because the former will never reach the level of the latter is evident in other assessment
programs. See, e.g., Abbott 11, 575 A.2d 359. 384-86 (NJ. 1990) (discussing and critiquing New
Jersey's assessment program).
193. In addition to the evidence regarding Hartford. Kansas City, and other Milliken II
districts, see PUMA ET AL., supra note 188 (describing performance in Title I schools); and
Tractenberg, supra note 17 (describing performance in New Jersey's urban school districts).
194. In addition to Ferguson's article and the evidence regarding whole-school reforms, there
have been other attempts to identify the programs that have proven the most successful in
boosting achievement. See, e.g.. COMMITirEE ON EDUC. & LABOR. 102D CONG..
SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN: THE IMPACT OF FISCAL INEQUALITY ON THE EDUCATION OF
STUDENTS AT RISK (Comm. Print 1991) (authored by William L. Taylor and Dianne M Piche).
These programs include early childhood education, full-day kindergarten, small classes
(especially for reading) in the earliest grades, and school-based health and social services. See
KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 190, at 138-45: VIPING OUT DISADVANTAGES. supra note 109.
On the other side of the coin, it is instructive to consider the results where states have taken
over districts, ostensibly on the ground that those districts were being mismanaged. Those results
axe, in a word, underwhelming. In New Jersey, for example, performance levels in Paterson and
Newark have changed little in the several years since the state took over the districts. See Jessica
L. Sandham, Despite Takeover Laws, States Moving Cautiously on Interventions. EDUC. WK..
Apr. 14, 1999, at 21. This disappointing showing by schools taken over by the state does not
prove, of course, that money spent wisely will be ineffective--because it is not clear that the state
is spending money wisely-but it does reveal that the obstacles facing high-poverty urban schools
are not amenable to quick fixes.
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3. Obstacles to Effective Spending
These observations raise the obvious question: What is the likelihood
that increased resources will be used effectively in high-poverty urban
districts? Given their past performance and the current structural obstacles
facing these districts, the answer is discouraging. It is certainly true that
urban educators and administrators face daunting problems, but it is also
undeniable that a number of those educators and administrators have made
some unwise and counterproductive decisions on how to spend funds, run
their schools, and teach their students.
Part of the problem arises from the location and atmosphere of poor
urban schools. They are often located in unsafe neighborhoods and
experience levels of violence that exceed those of their suburban
counterparts. This makes attracting the best teachers and administrators
difficult because, all else being equal, teachers and administrators tend to
choose schools that have pleasant and supportive environments.'95 Given
that salaries in suburban schools are often close to or exceed salaries in
urban schools, it is not surprising that teachers and administrators who can
choose their places of employment typically select suburban schools.'9 6
Compounding this recruitment and retention difficulty are the obstacles
to reform created by the racial isolation and poverty in the communities in
which urban schools are located. 97 In a recent case study of the Newark
public school system, for example, Jean Anyon describes how intense
poverty and racial isolation have helped to create a school system in which
political patronage, rather than merit, is often responsible for the
appointment of administrators. The Newark school system is one, Anyon
reports, where the low social status and lack of political power among
parents have created a lack of accountability among teachers and staff;
where teachers and administrators are often abusive to students; and where
teachers and administrators "appeared to be resigned to the failure of
reform efforts" in the schools. 98
195. See LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE RIGHT TO LEARN: A BLUEPRINT FOR CREATING
SCHOOLS THAT WORK 261-92 (1997); Ferguson, Paying for Public Education, supra note 190. at
480-81.
196. See Ferguson, Paying for Public Education, supra note 190, at 489-90.
197. On the inefficacy of past reform efforts to improve city schools, see, for example.
KOZOL, supra note 111, at 4; DONNA E. MUNCEY & PATRICK J. MCQUILLAN, REFORM AND
RESISTANCE IN SCHOOLS AND CLASSROOMS: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC VIEW OF THE COALITION OF
ESSENTIAL SCHOOLS (1996); DAVID TYACK & LARRY CUBAN, TINKERING TOWARD UTOPIA: A
CENTURY OF PUBLIC SCHOOL REFORM (1995); and Robert Rothman, Obstacle Course: Barriers
to Change Thwart Reformers at Every Twist and Turn, EDUC. WK., Feb. 10, 1993, at 9.
198. ANYON, supra note 13, at 3-38, 157-62. As a result of her study, Anyon has become
convinced that "poverty and racial isolation have often trivialized efforts.., to teach, to learn,
and to bring about change," id. at xiv, and she argues that educational reform efforts "must also
include efforts to restore economic and political opportunities to inner city residents," id. at xvi.
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Another case study of the St. Louis school system, undertaken by Amy
Stuart Wells and Robert L. Crain, concluded that "over the past thirty years
the St. Louis school board has taken better care of many of its employees
than it has of the children whose life chances depend on the board's ability
to lead." 199 As Crain and Wells explain, dedicated urban educators in such a
system "become outliers in a field of low expectations [and] many are
eventually swallowed up by the inertia." 2D They also point out that in poor
cities such as St. Louis, "most of the decent-paying jobs for African
Americans are in the public school system," and, not surprisingly,
"patronage and less-than-qualified employees" follow." Studies of
schools in Kansas City and Washington, D.C., have reached the same
conclusion. 2
That schools are seen as jobs programs in poor neighborhoods
undoubtedly skews decisionmaking. In particular, one would expect that in
such schools it would be difficult to adopt policy reforms that, regardless of
their benefit to students, would decrease personnel or otherwise threaten job
security. As a consequence, even if money spent wisely could significantly
improve inner-city schools, there appear at the moment to be serious
structural obstacles to efficient spending.
D. A Reprise
The conclusions one can reach based on the social science research are
necessarily somewhat tentative, given the lack of incontrovertible proof and
the surfeit of conflicting studies. The limitations of existing research
notwithstanding, there are some lessons to be drawn from the evidence. To
begin, race relations appear to be a crucial factor in perpetuaiing residential
segregation. In turn, residential segregation-given school districting rules
that typically assign children to neighborhood schools and the limitations
on desegregation remedies imposed by Milliken I-is primarily responsible
for current school segregation. Existing school segregation is not simply
manifested along racial lines, but also, given the disproportionately high
199. WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 12, at 130.
200. Id at 131.
201. Id
202. See Gerald W. Bracey, A Lesson in Throwing Aloney. 79 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 789. 789
(1998) (Kansas City); Michael Powell, No Accounting for Sonme lWorkers in D.C. Schools. WASH.
POST, Sept. 15, 1996, at Al; Valerie Strauss, D.C. Schools Hired People with Records. WASH.
POST., Apr. 13, 1995, at B 1; see also Beth Reinhardt. Racial Issues Cloud State Takeovers. EDUC.
WK., Jan. 14, 1998, at 1. For example, Williard H. Murray, an African-American Democrat who
represented Compton, California, for eight years until he retired in 1996. believes that school
boards in some poor minority communities have become centers of patronage because they are
one of the only large employers in town. As a result. Murray suggests. "the focus becomes
political, not educational." Reinhardt, supra, at 1.
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levels of poverty among the African-American population, along
socioeconomic lines.
Racially isolated schools, because they are also schools of concentrated
poverty, are more expensive to run than are majority-white schools, and
thus minority schools will generally require more than equal funding to be
placed on an equal footing with racially mixed or white schools. At the
same time, predominantly minority schools suffer from obstacles, largely
created by peer influence, that do not seem remediable by increasing
expenditures. Finally, even if we accept that more money, spent well, can
make a significant impact in predominantly minority schools, there is
evidence to suggest that such money has not been spent well in the past and
that, without changing the structure or organization of urban school
districts, it may be unrealistic to expect that it will be spent wisely in the
future.
All of which is to say that race plays an important, if not paramount,
role in keeping certain school districts beyond the reach of school finance
reform. It is also to say that, to the extent that race relations are responsible
for the concentration of poor minority students in urban public schools,
education policies that hold some promise of improving race relations may
be more effective in the long run than policies that intentionally or
unintentionally avoid the issue. School finance reform seems to fall
squarely in the latter category because it operates from a premise that
accepts rather than challenges the fact that most urban schools are isolated
by race and poverty. Insofar as it is the very fact of isolation that must be
overcome in order to improve substantially the opportunities of students
attending urban schools, alternatives (or at least additions) to school finance
litigation deserve to be considered-or, as the next Part suggests,
reconsidered.
IV. LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD
An alternative or supplement to school finance reform worthy of
(re)consideration is integration, along both racial and socioeconomic lines.
As mentioned at the outset, school finance litigation was initially seen as
something of a substitute for, or a complement to, desegregation. Currently,
as between these two approaches to improving the educational
opportunities for poor and minority students, school finance litigation is
clearly predominant. I have already suggested why reliance on school
finance reform may be unwise for minority districts. This Part argues that
integration, at least when it occurs along both racial and socioeconomic
lines, provides more demonstrable benefits for poor minority students than
does simply increasing expenditures in urban districts. Specifically, I
suggest that the short-run academic benefits of socioeconomic integration
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appear to be greater than the benefits of increased expenditures, and that the
long-run social benefits of racial integration seem difficult to replicate by
increasing expenditures in segregated schools.
After canvassing the social science evidence regarding the benefits of
desegregation, I suggest two possible approaches to increasing racial and
socioeconomic integration that I believe are worth exploring. One is to
reorient school finance cases in an effort to seek racial and socioeconomic
integration instead of, or in addition to, greater equalization of resources.
The other is to leverage political support for school choice and use it to
shape school choice in ways that will increase integration-for example, by
ensuring that suburban public schools participate in choice plans. While
neither strategy is a sure bet, both at least focus on the right problem-
namely, the isolation of poor minority students.
A. The Comparative Benefits of Integration
1. Academic Achievement
Urban schools are hamstrung, as explained earlier, by the concentrated
poverty among their students. If increasing expenditures in predominantly
poor schools is not particularly efficacious in overcoming the obstacles
created by concentrated poverty, one obvious alternative is to break up the
concentration of poor students and allow them the opportunity to attend
higher-socioeconomic-status schools. The response to the difficulties
presented by concentrated poverty, in other words, should be to encourage
socioeconomic integration.0 3
Some court-ordered desegregation plans have accomplished precisely
this goal, and there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that integrating
students from different socioeconomic backgrounds leads to significant
educational benefits for poorer students. The amount and consistency of
this evidence are quite surprising and often ignored in broader debates
about the costs and benefits of desegregation. The popular view of
desegregation is that it only occasionally helps boost academic achievement
among minority students and only occasionally improves race relations.
That view is true but incomplete, insofar as it ignores the evidence
regarding the benefits of socioeconomic integration.
Research consistently shows that introducing students from low
socioeconomic backgrounds into higher-socioeconomic-status schools has a
203. It is important to recognize that, given the link between race and poverty, socioeconomic
integration in most metropolitan areas would also entail racial integration. Thus, just as race and
class intersect in the creation and maintenance of the pathological conditions that afflict many
urban schools, so too do they intersect in affecting the efficacy and political plausibility of
socioeconomic integration.
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positive impact, often quite significant, on the poor students.2 James
Coleman, again, was one of the first to recognize this effect, concluding in
his report that "the environment provided by the student body... has its
greatest effect on those from educationally deficient backgrounds.2
Subsequent studies have reached similar conclusions. James Rosenbaum,
for example, compared students whose families were assigned to public
housing in suburban areas through Chicago's Gautreaux program with
those students whose families remained behind in public schools in
Chicago's ghettos. He found that the students who transferred to suburban
schools were more likely to be in college preparatory classes, less likely to
drop out, and more likely to attend college than those who were left behind
in ghetto schools.2°
Crain and Wells, in their case study of the St. Louis desegregation
program, found similar results. Under the St. Louis program, 13,000
minority students from the city attend suburban schools. City schools have
received additional resources, both for traditional and magnet schools.
Crain and Wells compared the educational progress and outcomes of the
students who attended suburban schools to those of the students who
remained in St. Louis city schools. They found that the black students who
transferred to suburban schools initially tested at a lower level than black
students in the city magnet schools, but at a slightly higher level than black
students who remained in traditional city schools. The suburban transfer
students, however, consistently improved their performance and by the
tenth grade were performing at higher levels than black students in all city
schools, including the magnets.2 7 The suburban transfer students also
204. The impact of such integration on wealthier students is not entirely clear from the
studies discussed in the text above. Studies regarding racial desegregation and its impact on the
academic achievement of white students consistently conclude that "[wlhite children fail to stiffer
any learning disadvantage from desegregation." Janet Ward Schofield, Review of Research on
School Desegregation's Impact on Elementary and Secondary School Students, in HANDBOOK Of
RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 597, 603 (James A. Banks, ed. 1995) (internal
quotations omitted). Since at least some of the white children involved in desegregation plans are
of a higher socioeconomic status than the black children involved, the findings with regard to
racial desegregation are of some relevance to socioeconomic integration as well. A plausible
inference from the studies, moreover, is that at a certain point-where the poorer students became
a majority or substantial minority of the student population-the effects of integration would be
detrimental to wealthier students. Clearly, however, the impact of socioeconomic integration on
wealthier students could benefit from more direct study than it has received.
205. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 165, at 304.
206. See James E. Rosenbaum, Black Pioneers-Do Their Moves to the Suburbs Increase
Economic Opportunity for Mothers and Children?, 2 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 1179, 1198
(1991).
207. See WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 12, at 148. That transfer students start out at lower
levels of achievement than magnet school students is especially important insofar as it suggests
self-selection cannot fully explain why suburban transfer students outperform their city
counterparts. The problem of self-selection and its effect on the accuracy of studies regarding
student performance is a recurring one and difficult to avoid; it plagues, for example, studies that
tend to show that poor minority children perform better in Catholic than in public schools. See.
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graduated at twice the rate of students in St. Louis city schools (although
the overall rate, fifty percent, is still remarkably low), and among all those
who did graduate, the transfer students were more likely to attend college.
Indeed, the college attendance rate of suburban transfer students, at sixty-
eight percent of those who graduated, was almost three times the national
average for black high school graduates.2ta
Another study focused on San Francisco contains similar findings.2
Prepared at the request of a federal district court judge examining various
desegregation plans, the study found that students from low socioeconomic
backgrounds posted significant gains in achievement when they transferred
to schools with more advantaged and higher-achieving students. This
improvement occurred, it bears observing, despite the fact that the transfer
schools received no increase in funding for additional programs as a result
of accepting transfer students. By contrast, students who remained in city
schools populated primarily by low-income students generally showed no
academic gains despite substantial increases in funding. "-
These case studies are bolstered by studies examining larger samples of
students. Rita Mahard and Robert Crain, for example, reviewed the results
of ninety-three separate studies on the effect of desegregation on student
achievement.2 ' Mahard and Crain found that, even controlling for ability
and socioeconomic status, desegregation consistently had positive, though
moderate, effects on black student achievement. 212  Perhaps more
importantly, they also found that desegregation plans that encompassed
both cities and suburbs resulted in the greatest academic gains for African-
e.g., CENTER FOR THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, APPENDIX C: CATHOLIC SCHOOLS SERVING
DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, winter 1997, at 140. 141 (reviewing
the literature on superior academic performance and the self-selection hypothesis); see also
ARMOR, supra note 22, at 108-1 1 (questioning the significance of the results of Project Concern.
which allowed Hartford students to attend suburban schools, on the ground that self-selection may
explain why students who remained in the program posted better academic results and were more
likely to attend college than students who either remained in Hartford schools or dropped out of
the program); Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, School Racial Composition and Black College
Attendance and Achievement in Test Performance. 51 SOC. OF EDUC. 81 (1978) (discussing the
mixed evidence for a self-selection hypothesis in assessing the effect of attending a predominantly
white school on black students' performance).
208. See WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 12, at 198-99.
209. See Orfield & Thronson, supra note 49, at 783 (citing GARY ORFIELD Er AL.
DESEGREGATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHANGE IN SAN FRANCISCO: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONSENT DECREE IMPLFMENTATION (1992) (report submitted to federal
district court)). Orfield and Thronson note that academic improvements were realized when
schools were totally reorganized-where, for example, the principal and the faculty were replaced
with a new staff-which "suggest[s] that extremely far reaching changes would be needed to
achieve in isolated schools the benefits that could be found in high achieving middle-class
schools." Id.
210. See Orfield & Thronson, supra note 49, at 783.
211. See Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain, Research on minority Achievement in
Desegregated Schools, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 103 (Christine R.
Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983).
212. SeeidU at 111.
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American students. They concluded that racial integration is most effective
when it also results in socioeconomic integration.213
Research also indicates that socioeconomic integration affects behavior
in ways that indirectly improve achievement. A study by Susan Mayer, for
example, found that even after controlling for socioeconomic status and
family background, tenth-grade students in affluent high schools were less
likely to drop out than those who attended poor schools, and that tenth-
grade girls in wealthier schools were less likely to have a child than their
counterparts in poor schools. 214 Her study also found that white students in
predominantly black schools were more likely to drop out and have a child
than whites in predominantly white schools."'
In sum, the research indicates that "one of the most effective ways to
improve children's cognitive skills is to put them in an environment with
other children who want to acquire cognitive skills and whose families
support such learning."2 6 More precisely, and perhaps more importantly,
the research also consistently shows that " [c]hildren of low socioeconomic
status appear[] to benefit significantly from exposure to more affluent and
more highly motivated peers."2 7
Advocates of desegregation have always been wary, justifiably, of
implying that black students need to attend school with white students in
order to improve their education, and critics of desegregation, particularly
from the far left, often attempt to ascribe such a motivation to those
promoting desegregation. 1 8 While black students need not sit next to white
213. See id. at 118.
214. See Susan E. Mayer, How Much Does a High School's Racial and Socioeconomic MLX
Affect Graduation and Teenage Fertility Rates?, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 321, 327
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (presenting data showing " that students who
attend high-SES schools are less likely to drop out and less likely to have a child than students of
the same race and socioeconomic background who attend lower-SES schools").
215. See id. at 334; see also WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 12, at 340 (noting that "much of
the research now suggests that African-American students who attend desegregated schools are
less likely to drop out of school, get pregnant, or get into trouble with the law than those from
segregated schools").
216. Richard J. Mumane, Evidence, Analysis, and Unanswered Questions, 51 HARv. EDUC.
REV. 483, 486 (1981).
217. YUDOF ET AL., supra note 40, at 597. Significantly, David Armor, who is largely
pessimistic about the academic benefits of desegregation, does not directly dispute the evidence
regarding the effect of socioeconomic integration. In Forced Justice, he finesses the question and
unfortunately never confronts it directly. He asserts, for example, that "sometimes achievement is
higher in desegregated schools and sometimes it is lower, but in most cases the differences in
achievement between desegregated and segregated schools are small once socioeconomic
differences are taken into account." ARMOR, supra note 22, at 113 (emphasis added). Although
Armor unfortunately does not elaborate, the italicized caveat suggests that socioeconomic
differences among schools are consistent with large achievement differences.
218. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 5, at 6, 68-69; Brown, supra note 16, at 816-17 (arguing
that the Supreme Court justified desegregation "as a means to remedy the cognitive,
psychological, educational, and emotional harm inflicted by segregation on African-Americans:
which is to say, it is a means to remedy a perceived deficit condition of African-Americans," and.
more directly, that the Supreme Court orders to desegregate rested on a "notion of African-
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ones in order to learn, the social science evidence strongly suggests that a
poor student will benefit from sitting in a classroom of middle-class
students."1 9 Because of the racial dimensions of poverty, a by-product of
racial integration is often (or certainly can be) socioeconomic integration.
To the extent there is truth to the "oppositional culture" thesis, moreover, it
may be especially productive to break up schools dominated by poor
minority students that reside in urban ghettos and integrate those students
into schools with more advantaged peers. This is not meant to imply any
inherent inferiority of black students but rather to confront the substantiated
fact that poor black students have benefited from integration in middle-class
schools, most of which happen to be primarily white. If one is honestly to
assess integration as an educational strategy, and to compare it to
alternatives like increased funding for single-race or predominantly
minority schools, this evidence must be addressed despite its ability to
cause discomfort.
2. Long-Tenn Benefits
A fairly recent and still-growing body of research consistently shows
strong long-term benefits of desegregation. This evidence has largely been
ignored in policy and court debates. As Wells and Crain explain, the
research regarding the long-term effects of desegregation was preceded by
studies that examined only the short-term impact of desegregation, typically
measured by performance on standardized test scores, and this older
research showed mixed results. 2' The relative recency of the new evidence,
combined with the mixed evidence regarding the short-term effects of
desegregation, may explain why the more recent evidence has been largely
ignored in policy and court debates: By the time studies examining the
American inferiority"). The critics do not always come from the left. See. e.g.. Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas. J., concurring).
219. See supra notes 205-218 and accompanying text.
220. See WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 12, at 340. These studies also suffered from
methodological shortcomings that render a significant number of them unreliable. See Schofield.
supra note 204. As Schofield explains, most studies did not take into account the degree of
classroom segregation within desegregated schools (through the use of tracking and ability
grouping, enrollment in special education classes, or simply self-separation), which obviously
makes it difficult to assess the extent to which students in these studies actually experienced
interracial contact. See id. at 598. Second, desegregation programs varied a great deal in how they
were implemented (and still do), and these variations influenced the effect of the program on the
students; yet most studies, particularly large-scale ones that examined a wide range of schools, did
not pay attention to these variations. See id. Third. because of pressure to complete their work
quickly, and because of a dearth of funds, most researchers conducted cross-sectional studies that
compared a group of students in a desegregated school with a group in a segregated school over a
relatively short time period-sometimes a single academic year. See id. Finally, desegregation
studies, regardless of type, will often suffer from self-selection problems at both the school and
individual level. As Schofield explains, the schools or families that agreed to participate in a
desegregation study likely differed in relevant ways from those that refused. See id.
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long-terms benefits of desegregation were published, desegregation had
been deemed a failure in many places.22' The premature conclusion that
desegregation is futile or counterproductive appears not only myopic from
an academic perspective, but practically quite unfortunate when one recalls
that an original goal of school desegregation was to break the cycle of
poverty and racial isolation that has traditionally burdened blacks.22
The research is now showing, just as desegregation plans are being
dismantled, that racial integration is fairly successful in meeting that goal
and in improving the "life chances" of minority students. Empirical
evidence indicates that blacks who graduate from desegregated schools are
more likely than those who graduate from segregated schools to attend both
two- and four-year colleges. 223 There is also some evidence that they are
more likely, while in college, to receive higher grades. 22' And they are more
likely to graduate from college and go on to earn higher incomes than
minority students who graduate from segregated schools.
225
Attending a desegregated school also appears to improve students'
chances for greater integration in later life, both in employment and in
housing. Researchers in the field have found evidence to support what they
have dubbed the "perpetuation theory," a theory that consists chiefly of the
intuitive notion that minorities who have not experienced desegregation
will themselves perpetuate racial segregation. 26 Research indicates, for
221. See WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 12, at 339-40.
222. See TUSHNET, supra note 17, at 6, 26-28; Carter, supra note 24. at 885.
223. See, e.g., ROBERT L. CRAIN ET AL., RAND CORP. REPORT No. R-3243-NIE, FINDING
NICHES: DESEGREGATED STUDENTS SIXTEEN YEARS LATER 24, 51 (1985); Jomills Braddock &
James McPartland, The Social and Academic Consequences of School Desegregation, EQUITY &
CHOICE, Feb. 1988, at 5, 8-9. See generally Liebman, supra note 24, at 1624-30 (discussing
empirical evidence).
224. The research on this point is rather thin, but not contradictory, as far as I can tell. See
Crain & Mahard, supra note 207, at 98-99.
225. See CRAIN ET AL., supra note 223, at 11-12, 51 (finding that black males who attended
desegregated public schools were 1.5 to 2 times as likely to complete college as those who
attended segregated public schools); Liebman, supra note 24. at 1626 & n.681 (collecting sources
indicating that blacks who attend desegregated schools "appear to receive higher average salaries
as adults" than do blacks who attend segregated schools); see also Schofield. supra note 204. at
607 (reviewing studies and concluding that, although the evidence is sparse and influenced by
region and gender, "attendance at desegregated schools appears to have some positive impact on
the kind of jobs African Americans get as well as on the amount and type of college education
they undertake"). Professor Liebman presents the evidence in its strongest light:
[I]mproving achievement test scores is the least clear of desegregation's beneficial
consequences. More certain is desegregation's positive impact on dropout. teenage
pregnancy, and delinquency rates; on the likelihood that blacks will attend and succeed
at college (particularly four-year colleges), secure employment in predominantly white
job settings, and live in integrated neighborhoods as adults; and on the salary levels
blacks attain in the labor market.
Liebman, supra note 13, at 356-57. See generally Joondeph, supra note 64, at 191-94 (reviewing
empirical evidence regarding the effects of desegregation on academic achievement,
unemployment opportunities, and social relations).
226. Jomills Braddock and James McPartland did some of the earliest theoretical and
empirical work on the subject. See Jomills H. Braddock II, The Perpetuation of Segregation
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example, that African Americans who have not regularly experienced
desegregated settings tend to overestimate the hostility that will greet them
in integrated settings and to underestimate their ability to cope in integrated
settings; they also tend to lack access, knowledge, and informal ties that
would lead them to integrated work or housing environments. 7 As a result,
African Americans tend to make choices in later life, such as where to live
or work, that perpetuate their physical segregation from whites, a condition
amply demonstrated by the figures on residential segregation discussed
above.
There is some evidence that school desegregation interrupts this self-
perpetuating cycle. It appears from studies conducted on this topic that
students-both black and white-who graduate from desegregated schools
are more likely to live in integrated neighborhoods and work in integrated
environments as adults.2  They are also more likely to have interracial
friendships and to have children who attend desegregated schools.' As
Braddock and McPartland report, studies have shown without exception
that "desegregation of schools leads to desegregation in later life-in
college, in social situations, and on the job." 23 Even David Armor, one of
Across Levels of Education: A Behavioral Assessment of the Contact-Hypothesis, 53 SOC. OF
EDUC. 178 (1980); Jomills Henry Braddock & James M. McPartland. Assessing School
Desegregation Effects: New Directions in Research. in RESEARCH IN SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION
AND SOCIALIZATION 259, 272 (Alan C. Kerckhoff & Ronald G. Corwin eds.. 1982). Not
surprisingly, the same tendency appears to exist among whites. See, e.g.. Schofield. supra note
204, at 610.
227. See Braddock, supra note 226, at 181. Mark Granovetter, The Micro-Structure of School
Desegregation, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION RESEARCH: NEW DIRECTIONS: lNSTrrlunONAL
ANALYSIS 81, 102-03 (Jeffrey Prager et al. eds., 1986) (demonstrating the importance of
acquaintances and classmates-or "weak ties" -in the transmission of employment information
and in creating employment opportunities); see also WELLS & CRAIN. supra note 12. at 340-42;
Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School
Desegregation, 64 REV. EDUC. RES. 531 (1994).
228. See, e.g., WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 12, at 551; Braddock. supra note 226. at 185:
Liebman, supra note 24, at 1627 (collecting sources); Liebman, supra note 13. at 357 n.40.
229. See, e.g., ROBERT CRAIN ET AL., A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF A METROPOLITAN
VOLUNTARY SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLAN 51 (1984) (finding that black students assigned to
integrated suburban schools rather than segregated schools were less likely to drop out of high
school or college, feel discriminated against in college, have a child before 18, or get into trouble
with the police, and that they were more likely to live in integrated neighborhoods and have white
friends); Braddock & McPartland, supra note 223. at 8-10, 63; see also Social Science Statement.
supra note 147, at 13a & n.22 (collecting additional sources); Joondeph. supra note 64. at 194
n.178 (collecting sources). But see ARiMOR, supra note 22, at 108-11 (arguing that the Crain study
is inconclusive because many students left suburban Hartford schools to return to urban schools).
230. Jomills Braddock et al., A Long-Term View of School Desegregation: Some Recent
Studies of Graduates as Adults, 66 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 259, 260 (1984); see also CRAIN ET AL,
supra note 223, at 24, 51; Willis D. Hawley & Mark A. Smylie. The Contribution of School
Desegregation to Academic Achievement and Racial Integration, in ELLMINATING RACISM:
PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY 281, 290 (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988) (arguing
that school desegregation integrates more effectively than fair housing or fair employment
programs); F.N. Hirsch, The Threnodv of Liberalism: Constitutional Liberty and the Renewal of
Community, 14 POL. THEORY 423, 443 n.96 (1986) (citing empirical literature documenting that
exposure to previously excluded persons, over time, will lead to acceptance and inclusion).
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the staunchest academic critics of mandatory desegregation plans, concedes
that "the research on long-term outcomes offers the strongest argument for
desegregated schools," acknowledging that "[s]ome national studies show
that minority students who attended desegregated schools are more likely to
live and work in desegregated environments as adults., 231 And Janet
Schofield observes in the most recent major review of desegregation studies
that the few studies that "bear on this point.. . suggest that in the long run
desegregation may help break a cycle of racial isolation in which both
minority- and majority-group members avoid each other even though this
limits their educational, occupational, social, and residential choices." 232
These findings gain additional salience in light of the evidence,
discussed above, regarding the obstacles to social and economic mobility
created by residential segregation. Oddly, school desegregation is rarely
identified as a potentially productive approach to overcoming residential
segregation and racial isolation. For example, Massey and Denton, like
William Julius Wilson before and after them, present a powerful case for
the proposition that residential segregation cuts off minorities from the
opportunities and networks of white middle-class society, while
simultaneously concentrating the deleterious conditions that accompany
intense poverty.233 Massey and Denton even go so far as to propose several
specific policy reforms, all of which involve tinkering with fair housing
laws, but none of which concerns school desegregation."
Similarly, there is a burgeoning literature on "metropolitanism" that
focuses on the costs of fracturing metropolitan areas into central cities and
surrounding suburbs.235 Contributors to this literature typically envision the
231. ARMOR, supra note 22, at 113. Armor nonetheless notes that caution is in order in
interpreting the studies because it is unclear whether school desegregation or preferences are
responsible for the results. As he notes, the studies do not distinguish between students who
attended schools that were desegregated as a result of residential desegregation and those that
were desegregated as a result of school desegregation; for the former, it is plausible to conclude
that the results shown in the studies "might simply be a family preference for desegregated
environments being passed on from one generation to the next." Id. Although Armor is correct to
point out this weakness in the studies, given the intense degree of residential segregation and the
fact (acknowledged by Armor) that school districts with desegregation plans experienced more
integration than those without, it is highly unlikely that the results can be explained solely or even
primarily by residential integration and passed-on preferences.
232. Schofield, supra note 204, at 610.
233. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK
DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996).
234. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 229-236. Similarly, Professor Roisman
criticizes Massey and Denton's recommendations for not going far enough to address the systemic
and structural problems identified by their analysis, and she offers additional reforms designed to
be more comprehensive and aggressive. See Roisman, supra note 114, at 512-25. Like Massey
and Denton, however, Professor Roisman fails to consider school desegregation as part of her
otherwise more comprehensive proposal.
235. See, e.g., DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL O1
SUBURBIA (1995); NEAL B. PEIRCE, CiTISTATES (1993); DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT
SUBURBS (1993); WEIHER, supra note 113; Frug, supra note 152.
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reorganization of local governments, either through the creation of
metropolitan-wide governments -36 or through the creation of inter-city
negotiating sessions where cities and suburbs would bargain over the costs
of providing services like police and fire protection and public schools.'
Noticeably absent from this literature are feasible and specific suggestions
as to how one might persuade or even force the suburbs-and their
representatives in the state legislature-either to dissolve completely or to
engage in a bargaining process that seems primarily designed to redistribute
funds from the suburbs to the cities and to open up suburban schools to
urban students. s
More precisely, as Professor Zelinsky pointed out in a review of three
recent works in the field, the shared vision of many of these commentators
"is of local government without local politics-or at least without local
politics as we know it today."", 9 Those favoring the alteration of existing
land-use policies have had little success in the past, in the courts or the
legislature, in convincing the American public to integrate its suburbs.2'
Zelinsky is persuasive in asserting that "until the battle for public opinion is
won, it is unlikely that any structural innovation, like the establishment of
metropolitan government or litigation-based remedies, will achieve by fiat
what cannot be accomplished by politics." 24 The issue thus seems to be not
the structure of municipal government, but "the preferences of the
American people." 
242
236. See, e.g., PEIRCE, supra note 235, at x-xi; RUSK. supra note 235. at 10-35.
237. See Frug, supra note 152, at 42-45; see also Jerry Frug. The Geography of Community.
48 STAN. L. REv. 1047, 1104-07 (1996) (suggesting that cities in metropolitan areas should
negotiate with neighboring localities in order to build communities and address the area's
problems).
238. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 152, at 58. Professor Frug offers a proposal that rejects the
current school-districting rules and "installs in their place a system that makes both educational
resources and students the responsibility of the region as a whole." Id. Regardless of one's
sympathy for or antipathy toward Professor Frug's end goal. it is difficult to discern just how that
goal will be reached, especially given his explicit rejection of reliance "on government orders and
court mandates." Id.
239. Edward A. Zelinsky, Metropolitanisin Progressivism, and Race. 98 COLUM. L REV.
665, 667 (1998) (reviewing KIRP ET AL., supra note 235; PEIRCE, supra note 235: RUSK. supra
note 235).
240. The Mount Laurel litigation, the subject of KiRP ET AL. supra note 235. is the most
famous attempt to use the courts to force suburbs to include low-income housing opportunities.
See Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (NJ. 1986); Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel. 456 A.2d 390 (NJ. 1983); Southern Burlington
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975). As Kirp and his co-authors
describe, although the New Jersey Supreme Court was originally quite aggressive in attempting to
force suburban towns to provide low- and moderate-income housing, it eventually retreated and
upheld fair housing legislation that grants suburban towns a number of ways to avoid their
supposed obligation to zone for low-income housing. See KIRP ET AL. supra note 235. at 90. 137.
157, 159; see also Zelinsky, supra note 239, at 687-88 (describing the Mount Laurel litigation and
its aftermath and noting that the most revealing fact from the Kirp study may be that there is no
low-income housing in Mount Laurel today).
241. Zelinksky, supra note 239, at 667.
242. Id. at 668.
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To the extent that Zelinsky is correct, the long-term benefits of school
desegregation deserve to be considered in approaches to increasing
metropolitan integration. Whether residential segregation is caused by
socioeconomics, preferences, discrimination, or a combination of all three,
the long-term studies of school desegregation suggest that it may be a
productive if slow-going response. School integration appears to increase
the "life chances" of minorities and their prospect of attaining higher
socioeconomic status, which should reduce the role that socioeconomics
plays in causing residential segregation. School integration also appears to
make minority students (and their white counterparts) more comfortable in
integrated settings, which undoubtedly reshapes preferences and likely
assists in diminishing discrimination. Indeed, school integration and
residential integration have the potential for creating a self-perpetuating
cycle of integration rather than segregation.243 To be sure, the process may
be long, and school integration is unlikely to be a panacea for residential
segregation. 244 But school integration seems to be a more realistic prospect
than simply hoping that cities-without doing anything in particular-can
persuade suburbs to open their borders.
I suggested above that the academic benefits of integration flow largely
along class lines and that mixing students of different economic
243. See, e.g., Schofield, supra note 204, at 610 (reviewing studies and opinion surveys
indicating that desegregated school experiences can alter attitudes of whites and blacks toward
members of the other group, and indicating in particular that "[w]hites in desegregated schools
frequently show a decrease in their often initially high levels of fear and avoidance of African
Americans, and an increasing willingness and ability to work with them"). For discussion of
literature suggesting that experiences shape preferences and specifically that "Iprivate
preferences often do adjust to limitations in current practices and opportunities," see Cass R.
Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2420 (1994). See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 758-61 (1991) (same).
244. Some evidence indicates that increased levels of school integration lead to decreased
amounts of residential segregation and that metropolitan-wide desegregation plans reduce housing
segregation in the metropolitan area more than city-only plans. See Diana Pearce, Breaking Down
Barriers: New Evidence on the Impact of Metropolitan School Desegregation on Housing
Patterns, Report to the National Institute of Education, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 1980) (pairing
seven cities, and finding that cities involved in metropolitan-wide desegregation plans experience
more housing desegregation than those involved in city-only plans); Diana Pearce et al., Lessons
Not Lost: The Effect of School Desegregation on the Rate of Residential Segregation in Large
Central Cities, Paper Presented to the Center for National Policy Review, Washington, D.C.
(1984) (examining the 25 largest cities with black populations over 100,000 in 1980 and finding a
substantial correlation between a reduction in school segregation and a reduction in central-city
housing segregation). These two studies have been criticized on methodological grounds by
Armor and Rossell. See ARMOR, supra note 22, at 149-51, Christine H. Rossell, Does School
Desegregation Policy Stimulate Residential Integration? A Critique of the Research. 21 URB.
EDUC. 403, 404-15 (1987). Armor, for example, points out that the more recent study only
computes the dissimilarity index for black versus nonblack and thus does not calculate the impact
of increased numbers of Hispanics and Asians in central cities. See ARMOR, supra note 22, at 149.
He also observes that examining only the segregation indices for central cities ignores white flight
to the suburbs, see id. at 149-50, although the 1980 Pearce study seems to meet that criticism by
showing that metropolitan-wide desegregation plans are associated with greater housing
desegregation than city-only plans.
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backgrounds appears to be more influential on academic achievement than
simply mixing students of different races. Over the long run, however, there
appear to be benefits from integration that flow along racial lines and are of
singular importance to African-American students. African-American
students, much more often than poor students of other races and ethnic
backgrounds, are trapped in an intergenerational cycle of isolation and
poverty.245 School integration seems to offer the promise of breaking this
cycle in a way that has not been documented with regard to other reform
efforts, such as increased school expenditures. In addition, social
integration in schools has the potential to increase racial understanding and
tolerance, which school finance reform cannot address and which would
obviously benefit white as well as black students. This is not to say, of
course, that racial integration will always be successful. But when it is
successful, racial integration appears to offer important benefits that are not
easily replicated by other policies, including school finance reform.2'
B. Two Strategies for Increasing Integration
To those who are persuaded that continued segregation in schools by
race and income creates obstacles that money will not overcome, and that
seeking ways to increase racial and socioeconomic integration is an
important endeavor, the question obviously becomes: What can be done? I
suggest two possible approaches that are not intended to exhaust the field.
The first is to reorient school "finance" cases to seek racial and
socioeconomic integration as a remedy for the deprivation of a
constitutionally guaranteed adequate or equal education. The second is to
take advantage of the current popularity of school choice and to make a
concerted effort to structure school choice programs in ways that will best
ensure that disadvantaged students benefit from choice plans.
1. Creating a Fourth Wave of School Finance Litigation
School finance cases, not surprisingly, have concentrated primarily on
money. In the first two waves of school finance litigation, plaintiffs and
courts focused on equal protection and education clauses in arguing or
concluding that students possess a right to equal educational opportunities.
In the third wave, the focus has generally narrowed to education clauses,
245. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2. at 130-47.
246. The success of racial integration in altering life chances and improving race relations
depends, of course, on how the integration plan is implemented. See, e.g.. Social Science
Statement, supra note 147, at 14a-21a.
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and the right asserted is typically one to an adequate education.24 7 Despite a
change in legal theories, the remedy sought in school finance cases has
remained more or less the same over time: to increase spending in the
plaintiff districts and all others similarly situated. There is no reason,
however, why the rights recognized in these cases must be defined solely in
monetary terms, nor why the remedy for their violation must be limited to
funding.
As I have explained at length elsewhere, the key to discovering
alternative approaches lies in the fact that the fight to an adequate or equal
education is an affirmative right. These rights obligate the state to provide a
constitutionally sufficient education to all students. 48 If courts are going to
enforce such a right, as a significant number of state courts are currently
doing, they necessarily must articulate or embrace some definition of an
equal or an adequate education. Up until now, courts have embraced the
plaintiffs' definition of the constitutional fight and have generally equated
sufficient funding with a constitutional school system. Providing adequate
or equal funding may be one way for a state to fulfill its affirmative duty,
but it is surely not the only way.
Indeed, the evidence regarding the inefficacy of increased expenditures
suggests that providing additional resources may not even be a particularly
effective way for the state to remedy unequal or inadequate schooling.
Given the research canvassed above, a more effective approach may entail
ensuring that poorer students have access to more advantaged peers. Thus,
instead of arguing for equalized or adequate resources, school "finance"
plaintiffs should consider arguing for socioeconomic or racial integration,
or both. Relying on the social science evidence that demonstrates the short-
and long-term benefits of socioeconomic and racial integration, plaintiffs
should be able to formulate an argument that racial and socioeconomic
integration are necessary components of a student's constitutional right to
an equal or adequate education. 249
247. As mentioned above, the classification of school finance cases into waves vastly
oversimplifies the cases, both by eliding decisions, like New Jersey's or Kentucky's, that straddle
the equality/adequacy approach and by ignoring the fact that the chronological progression has not
been without exceptions. For example, one of the most recent school finance decisions, from
Vermont, explicitly recognized the right to an equal education. See Brigham v. State. 692 A.2d
384 (Vt. 1997). For my purposes here, however, the wave categorization is sufficient to
distinguish different approaches to school finance cases, and, especially, to distinguish the
approach I suggest from earlier ones. In a nutshell, the first three waves, while resting on different
legal theories, have all sought remedies focusing on the distribution of resources. The fourth wave
that I propose would focus on the distribution of students.
248. See Ryan, supra note 16, at 546-47.
249. For an extended discussion of how these claims could be formulated, as well as possible
objections to them, see id. at 553-60. One potentially insuperable obstacle to a state court decision
ordering racial integration should be noted here. It is possible that the Supreme Court would hold
unconstitutional voluntary efforts by states to increase racial integration. See id. at 559-60. At the
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This is precisely the argument that the plaintiffs made in Sheff. The
Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the court
rested its decision on a segregation clause in the state constitution and held
that the clause bars de facto school segregation. Because only two other
states-Hawaii and New Jersey-have such clauses, the general consensus
seems to be that the Connecticut case will and must remain unique. -  But it
need not remain so, for the simple reason that the affirmative right to an
adequate or equal education is broad enough to encompass racial and
socioeconomic integration. To be sure, the social science evidence
regarding the educational benefits of racial and socioeconomic integration
is not unequivocal, but neither is the evidence regarding the benefits of
increased expenditures. In fact, the evidence regarding the former is much
stronger. If courts have been willing to conclude that adequate or equal
resources have a sufficient connection to the quality of education a student
receives and thus to order increased funding as a remedy in school finance
cases, there is little logical reason to disregard the evidence establishing the
connection between the type of students in a school and the quality of
education that takes place there.
Logical arguments, of course, do not necessarily win cases. To some,
this suggestion may seem naYve or even dangerous, insofar as it raises the
specter of forced integration. I do not harbor the illusion that courts would
rush to embrace this theory, and I recognize at the outset that it could
succeed only in states (eighteen so far) whose courts are willing to
recognize a constitutional right to an equal or adequate education. I also do
not expect that courts would be willing to enforce mandatory busing, nor do
I think that plaintiffs would be wise to request such relief.
But eighteen state supreme courts have already demonstrated a
commitment to enforcing the right to an equal or adequate education and to
requiring that educational resources within states be redistributed. In
addition, alternative remedies, such as the creation of magnet schools to
draw suburban students into urban districts and the creation of interdistrict
choice plans, could achieve a fair degree of racial and socioeconomic
integration without the coercive and politically unpalatable effects of forced
busing."' Given the demonstrated willingness of a significant number of
state courts to force their respective legislatures to redistribute their
resources, despite the controversy generated by such decisions, it does not
seem entirely implausible to think that a state court might be willing to
order states to create incentives for increased integration. In fact, it seems a
sufficiently plausible outcome that school finance advocates, frustrated with
moment, the constitutionality of using race voluntarily (that is. not as a part of a remedy for prior
segregation) in assigning elementary and secondary students is an open question. See id.
250. See id. at 546.
251. See ARMOR, supra note 22, at 226-31. ORFIELD ET AL. supra note 22, at 194. 354-55.
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the results of "successful" school finance litigation, should consider this
approach.
2. Shaping School Choice
Another option to consider is school choice. School choice is surely the
most hotly debated topic in school reform at the moment. It is also
increasingly popular, and support for school choice in general has grown
beyond a core constituency of free-market conservatives and religious
groups. While many civil rights groups, including the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, remain opposed to school choice, polls indicate that a
majority of African-American parents support it, as do a number of
prominent African-American leaders.5
Until this point, the debate about school choice has typically revolved
around the advisability of adopting voucher programs for private schools.
Proponents and foes have argued as to whether such programs would
violate federal and state constitutional provisions prohibiting the
establishment of religion; whether they would improve all schools through
the introduction of competition or would merely siphon off the best
students and leave some schools worse off than they are now; and whether
such programs would increase or ameliorate the existing stratification by
race and income found in schools in most metropolitan areas. 53 Although
252. See James Brooke, Minorities Flock to Cause of Vouchers for Schools, N.Y. TIMm.
Dec. 27, 1997, at Al (reporting survey results indicating that 72% of black parents polled
supported school vouchers while the general public split 48% to 48%). At the same time, the
NAACP has joined with People for the American Way to oppose vouchers. See Kweisi Mfume &
Carole Shields, A Partnership for Public Education (visited Feb. 22, 1999)
<http://www.everychildcounts.org/pageO.shtml>.
253. For concise but thorough discussions of the various arguments for and against school
choice, see Michael Heise, Assessing the Efficacy of School Desegregation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REv.
1093, 1104-09 (1996); Stephen D. Sugarman, Using Private Schools To Promote Public Values:
The Redesign of Urban Education, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171; see also Diane Ravitch.
Somebody's Children: Educational Opportunities for All, in NEW SCHOOLS FOR A NEW CENTURY
251 (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 1997). One of the most important issues, of course,
is whether vouchers for religious schools run afoul of religion clauses in state and federal
constitutions. As of this writing, five state supreme courts and one federal appeals court have
ruled on school choice programs that allow vouchers or tax credits to be used for covering or
subsidizing the costs of religious schools. The courts have split in their results. Three state
supreme courts have ruled that vouchers or tax credits can be applied to tuition at private religious
schools without violating state or federal religion clauses. See Kotterman v. Killian. 972 P.2d 606
(Ariz. 1999) (ruling that providing tax credits to subsidize tuition at private religious schools does
not violate the religion clauses of the state or federal constitutions); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 71 I
N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999) (ruling that allowing vouchers to be used at private religious schools does
not violate the religion clauses of the state or federal constitutions); Jackson v. Benson. 578 N.W.
2d 602 (Wis. 1998) (same), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998). Two state supreme courts and a
federal court of appeals have reached the contrary conclusion. See Strout v. Albanese. 178 F.3d 57
(1st Cir. 1999) (holding that allowing parents to use vouchers at religious schools would violate
the Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't., 728 A.2d
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the participants often speak with absolute certainty about the impact of
vouchers, much of this debate is necessarily theoretical, as there are
relatively few existing voucher programs and there are countless ways to
structure such programs. Much of the debate also ignores other types of
choice programs, including public-school choice and charter schools, which
at the moment are more in use than voucher programs and which present
different possibilities and challenges than do private-school vouchers.
Rather than canvas all of the issues raised by various choice proposals,
which is beyond the scope of this Article, I would like to make three points
in favor of considering choice programs-both public and private-as a
means of improving the educational opportunities for disadvantaged
students, especially disadvantaged minority students. The first is one of
practical necessity: The lack of choice for students from poor
neighborhoods means that those students will be attending neighborhood
schools that are filled predominantly with impoverished students. Unless
and until there is greater residential integration, which does not seem to be
happening with much rapidity,2' the only hope for achieving greater racial
and socioeconomic integration within schools is to allow students in
neighborhoods isolated by race and income to attend diverse private
schools 255 or public schools outside of their neighborhoods. -' Similarly, it
127, 136-46 (Me. 1999) (same); Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Department of Educ.. No. 97-275.
1999 WL 378244 (Vt. June 11, 1999) (same).
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue, although it is likely that it will
do so in the near future, given the split among courts and the importance of the question.
Commentators are divided in their predictions of how the Court will resolve the issue, but there
seems to be more support for the prediction that the Court will uphold the use of vouchers at
religious schools. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-10, at
1223 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that the Court's recent Establishment Clause decisions indicate
that "the Court would uphold an educational voucher scheme that would permit parents to decide
which schools, public or private, their children should attend"): Jesse H. Choper, The
Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update. 75 CAL. L REV. 5. 13 (1987)
(same); Michael W. McConnell, Multiculturalisin, Majoritarianisin. and Educational Choice:
What Does Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?. 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 123. 143-47
(same); Joseph Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State
Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657. 661 (1998) (same). But see David
Futterman, School Choice and the Religion Clauses: The Law and Politics of Public Aid to
Private Parochial Schools, 81 GEO. L.J. 711. 732 (1993) (concluding that using tuition vouchers
at religious schools is fundamentally at odds with the Establishment Clause); Harlan A. Loeb &
Debbie N. Kaminer, God, Money and Schools: Voucher Programs Impugn the Separation of
Church and State, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 37 (1996) (same). How the Court resolves the
issue is quite important for the future of voucher programs, both because most private schools
(80%) are sectarian and because Catholic schools are the only private schools that have
demonstrated consistently an ability to produce strong results among disadvantaged students for a
relatively low tuition. See CENTER FOR THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN. supra note 207. at 140.
254. See Farley & Frey, supra note 121, at 39.
255. By "diverse" I simply mean private schools that are not composed primarily of poor
minority students.
256. 1 am certainly not the first to recognize this point. Paul Gewirtz. in an article in which he
otherwise opposed the use of school choice as a substitute for mandatory desegregation.
recognized that interdistrict choice may be the only way to achieve interracial contact in many
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seems unlikely that many suburbanites who cannot afford private schools
will move back to cities if their children must attend poor-performing city
schools. Magnet schools have shown some ability to attract suburban
students to city schools, 257 and it is reasonable to expect that vouchers for
private schools would attract even more. In short, if one believes that urban
schools are unlikely to overcome the obstacles created by concentrated
poverty and racial isolation, the only alternative is to break apart those
schools and allow students the opportunity to go elsewhere. 58
The second point is that whether choice programs work to the benefit or
detriment of disadvantaged students will depend entirely upon how they are
structured. Much of the conversation about school choice is short on details
and long on predictions about how choice in general is either a "panacea"
for or an unmitigated threat to education in the United States.25 ' Debating
choice in the abstract, however, is about as productive as a single person
with no current prospects for marriage debating whether marriage would
improve his or her life. In school choice, as in marriage, the details will
make all the difference. A voucher program, for example, that is limited to
low-income students, provides each student $6500 and covers full
transportation costs, requires participating schools to accept students by
lottery, aggressively disseminates information about schools to parents and
assists them in choosing schools, ensures that public schools that lose
students retain sufficient resources to provide an adequate education, and
requires suburban schools to accept students if space allows will surely
have a decent chance of improving the educational opportunities of students
currently attending inner-city schools. By contrast, a plan that provides all
students a $1000 voucher that can be used only at urban private schools,
metropolitan areas. See Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the
Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728, 778-79 (1986).
257. See WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 12, at 146; Rossell & Armor. supra note 150. at 296-
99.
258. Allowing school choice does not guarantee, of course, that all parents will choose better
schools or schools outside of their own neighborhoods. Allowing school choice, however, will
surely result in some parents' choosing different and better schools for their children, as the
choice programs in St. Louis and East Harlem demonstrate. See generally CHUBB & MOE, supra
note 167, at 212-15 (discussing the East Harlem intra-district school choice plan); WELLS &
CRAIN, supra note 12, at 180-218 (discussing black city students who choose to attend suburban
schools). In addition, efforts can be made to provide information to parents regarding the choices
available, as occurs in East Harlem and Cambridge. See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 167, at 210-
15. Finally, efforts can also be made to provide incentives to encourage parents to choose
integrated schools. See, e.g., ARMOR, supra note 22, at 228-31. Armor proposes what he calls an
"equity-choice" plan, which would entail devoting additional resources to city schools to convert
them into magnet schools, allowing parents to choose any school within a largely defined
geographical area and giving priority and transportation subsidies to transfers that improve the
racial balance at the sending or receiving schools. See id.
259. Compare CHUBB & MOE, supra note 167, at 217 (arguing that "reformers would do
well to entertain the notion that choice is a panacea"), with Mfume & Shields. supra note 252
(arguing that vouchers will pose an enormous threat to public education), and Liebman, supra
note 167, at 277-93 (same).
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does not provide for transportation, provides little assistance and
information to parents, and allows schools to use whatever criteria they
choose to select students will probably not do much to help disadvantaged
students and may cause some harm, insofar as the vouchers would mostly
siphon off families that could afford to supplement them and that are savvy
and motivated enough to select a good private school.
In short, both sides in the school choice debate are surely exaggerating
when they claim that the mere adoption of a choice plan, regardless of its
content, will benefit or harm students. My immediate concern, however, is
with the opponents of school choice, and my argument is simply that it is
incorrect to assume that no school choice plan could improve the
opportunities available to a substantial number of disadvantaged students. If
my first point is correct, and introducing some element of choice is
necessary to improve the opportunities available to students in failing
schools, then those interested in assisting disadvantaged students would do
well to descend from the ethereal realm of school choice generalizations
and to start considering and debating what a choice plan should look like.
The third point is related to the second: The growing popularity of
school choice, combined with the fact that the specific details of choice
plans remain to be formulated, provides an excellent opportunity to shape
the content of such plans. A good portion of the opposition to school choice
undoubtedly stems from the belief that choice plans, regardless of their
theoretical potential to assist disadvantaged students, will be structured in a
way that will help middle-class students escape failing public schools while
leaving disadvantaged students to wallow in either the same schools or
equally poor private schools. 2' The current political climate, however,
seems conducive to producing bargains that will help ensure that
disadvantaged students are not ignored in choice plans. Those who support
school choice for economic, ideological, or religious reasons do not seem
sufficiently numerous to secure its adoption; they need allies, who will
obviously be in a position to influence how the plans are designed.
260. The fear that choice programs will skim off the best students (or students with the most
motivated parents) and leave urban schools filled only with the most disadvantaged students
looms large in the opposition to school choice. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 167. at 292. Some
existing choice programs, including the current voucher plans in Milwaukee and Cleveland,
respond to this fear by limiting vouchers to low-income students and by continuing to provide
public schools a portion of the funding that exiting students would have brought into those
schools. Another possible backstop is the education clauses that have formed the basis for school
finance challenges; these clauses could be used (at least in states that have recognized the right to
an equal or adequate education) to challenge choice programs that do not ensure that all schools
remain at least adequate. See Note, The Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State
Constitutional Guarantees of Educational Quality, 109 HARV. L. REv. 2002 (1996) (arguing that
education clauses in state constitutions require the states adopting school choice programs to
ensure that all students continue to receive an adequate education). Finally. it is worth considering
the possibility that those "left behind" in public schools could actually benefit if the school
population and class sizes decrease.
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The examples of the only (relatively) large-scale, publicly-funded
voucher programs, in Milwaukee and Cleveland, support this hypothesis. In
both cities, the voucher programs are limited to low-income students
attending inner-city public schools. The reason that these limited programs
were adopted, rather than programs that applied outside of urban schools or
to all students within urban schools, has to be that political support was
sufficient to secure only the limited program. The support of advocates for
poor urban students, in turn, appears to have been a critical factor in the
creation and adoption of the programs.26
Advocates for disadvantaged students, particularly minority students,
clearly have reason to be skeptical, if not cynical, about reliance on the
political process.262  But this skepticism should not blind them to
opportunities within that process when they arise, particularly when the
alternatives are as bleak and unpromising as they appear to be for poor
minority students. Taking my three points together, therefore, I would urge
those interested in improving the educational opportunities for
disadvantaged students to focus on the elements of choice plans that are
likely to be most beneficial to those students and to attempt to strike
bargains with other groups that support school choice to ensure that those
elements are included. Factors that deserve attention surely include, but are
not limited to, the amount of the voucher, the mandatory inclusion of
suburban public schools as recipients of students, transportation costs, the
dissemination of information to parents, assurance that public schools that
lose students still have sufficient resources to provide an adequate
education, and admissions criteria for public or private schools.26 All of
these facets of school choice will have to be addressed in any choice plan
adopted, and if I am right in observing that advocates of disadvantaged
261. See Emily Van Dunk, Exploring the Market for School Choice, EDUC. WK., Sept. 16.
1998, at 39 (describing a coalition of pro-voucher conservatives and African Americans in
Milwaukee and Cleveland).
262. This is particularly true with regard to school choice, given its historical connection to
attempts by Southern states to avoid desegregation. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.
430 (1968); see also Molly Townes O'Brien, Private School Vouchers and the Realities of Racial
Politics, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 359, 374-92 (1997) (tracing the political and legal history of the
voucher movement and the use of vouchers by Southern legislatures to avoid integration).
263. Of special importance is the inclusion of public suburban schools in choice programs
and the provision of some transportation aid. Interdistrict choice plans exist in a number of states,
but typically they allow schools to opt out and refuse to accept transfer students. They also often
fail to cover transportation costs. See Constance Hawke, The "Choice" for Urban School
Districts: Open Enrollment or Desegregation, 115 EDUc. LAW. REP. 609, 610 n.6 (1997); Angela
G. Smith, Public School Choice and Open Enrollment: Implications for Education.
Desegregation, and Equity, 74 NEB. L. REv. 255, 273-74 (1995). Massachusetts is a perfect
example: Transportation costs are not provided and participation by school districts is voluntary.
According to one report, only 25% of all the districts in the state participate in the plan. and none
of the suburban districts surrounding Boston participates. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing
Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 113, 172 (1996) (citing ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, SCHOOL CHOICE IN
MASSACHUSETTS 67 (1991)).
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students seem to be in a strong bargaining position with regard to school
choice, these facets can be shaped in a way that will work to the benefit of
those students.?
V. CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to buck an historical trend. Education law, policy,
and commentary are clearly moving away from integration as a direct goal
in education reform and are embracing various methods to improve the
resources available and the education provided in racially and
socioeconomically isolated schools. I contend that it is too early to abandon
concerted efforts to achieve greater integration and to relegate integration to
merely a potential by-product of alternative reforms. I also suggest
specifically that, as between integration and school finance reform, if one
were rationally to choose a strategy for assisting poor minority students, the
evidence discussed in this Article points clearly in the direction of
integration.' School finance reform litigation has not proven, as its
advocates had hoped, to be an adequate substitute for school desegregation.
Simply put, the evidence suggests that increasing expenditures does not
have the same educational punch as integration.
To be sure, there are a number of strong reasons why school finances
should be equalized, basic fairness and decency to innocent children not
least among them. And those who have pursued this goal appear by all
lights to be acting out of a sincere and admirable desire to assist
disadvantaged students. Nonetheless, it strikes me as possible that school
finance litigation is not simply a poor substitute for desegregation, but also
a costly distraction. To the extent that the central problem facing urban
minority districts is their racial and economic isolation, school finance
reform takes attention and effort away from addressing that problem and
creates battles over the funding of those districts. Even if those battles are
successful, the districts will remain isolated. Indeed, by defining the
problem as one of inadequate funding, school finance advocates may be
264. For a good example of how school choice plans can be structured in a way that assists
disadvantaged students, see JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE:
THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL 190-211 (1978); and JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D.
SUGARMAN, SCHOLARSHIPS FOR CHILDREN (1992). Coons and Sugarman, it beas mentioning,
were early school finance advocates and together with William Clune wrote a classic early work
advocating fiscal neutrality (that is, equal funding for equal tax effort) as the principle around
which school finance systems should be organized. See COONS Er AL. supra note 30. at 201-42.
265. Advocates in Connecticut recognized as much, and this explains why they pursued the
Sheff case despite earlier school finance litigation that had been successful in increasing
expenditures in Hartford. See Ryan, supra note 16, at 536-38.
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unwittingly legitimizing the de facto segregation of districts by race and
income.26
What I have left largely unexplored in this Article is the question of
political will, namely, whether a sufficient number of suburban parents and
legislators can be persuaded to allow urban minority students to share their
schools or to share private or public urban schools, and whether an equally
sufficient number of minority parents can be persuaded to send their
children to integrated suburban or urban schools. My speculation is that
they can be, if the case is made correctly and sufficient attention is paid to
how integration would occur. To think otherwise is to believe that a
majority of parents and legislators have no interest in integration and would
oppose any attempt to achieve it, a supposition contradicted by opinion
polls and by specific examples of voluntary desegregation programs. In
order to make a persuasive case, school finance and school desegregation
scholars and advocates must begin to work together, and they must examine
much more thoroughly the evidence gathered in both fields of research.
School finance advocates in particular must acknowledge that, at least in
states with substantial minority populations, litigation over school funding
may be a costly distraction from the more pressing problem of racial and
socioeconomic isolation. To be sure, persuading parents and legislators to
work toward greater integration will be something of a battle, but it at least
appears to be the right battle to fight.
266. Cf KOZOL, supra note 11, at 209-10; Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the
Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 948 (1998); Louis Michael Seidman. Brown and
Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 715 (1992) ("Rather than sparking continued struggle for change.
[Brown] has served to deaden political debate and to legitimate the status quo.").
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